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The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment determines, in large
measure, the allocation of responsibility and power between the states
and the government of the United States. It has been characterized as
"the most significant [Amendment] in our history' 2 and a "second
American Constitution."'3 It is therefore not surprising that some of
the most important disputes in the United States Supreme Court have
been over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
disputes have involved some of the most important legal thinkers of
our times.
In the twentieth century, one of the most familiar articulations of
differing views occurred in Adamson v. California,4 a five-four deci-
sion, in which Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion represented the
best efforts of the majority and in which Hugo Black wrote an equally
powerful minority opinion. This judicial battle between competing
views of the Amendment continued intermittently throughout the
march to "incorporate" additional amendments or portions of amend-
ments, becoming particularly explicit in the six-three decision of Bart-
kus v. Illinois,5 and the seven-two decision of Duncan v. Louisiana.6
Even today there are suggestions of a new Court debate over the in-
corporation doctrine.7
This clash in the Court was paralleled in the academic world by
the work of Stanford, Washington University, and Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Charles Fairman8 and Yale prodigy and University of Chicago
2. HAROLD HYMAN & WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW xiv (1992).
Charles Fairman considered the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause "the two
most important passages in the entire Constitution." Charles Fairman, What Makes A Great
Justice?, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 50 (1950).
3. James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985).
4. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
5. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The incorporation features of this decision are contained princi-
pally in the majority opinion of Justice Frankfurter and the dissent of Justice Black. Id. at 150.
6. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Though Justice Frankfurter was no longer living when Duncan was
decided, his views were upheld by the second Justice Harlan. The principal dispute was set forth
in Justice Black's concurring opinion and Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 162, 171.
7. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). Compare Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion (takings clause applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment), id. at 2316
n.5, with Justice Steven's dissent in which Justice Blackmun and Justice Ginsburg joined (indicat-
ing that the majority was relying upon substantive due process cases and suggesting that the Just
Compensation Clause has not been incorporated), id. at 2326-29.
8. Fairman's principle contributions are the following articles: Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); The Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 40 (1953); A
Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 144 (1954); RECONSTRUCrION AND REUNION,
1864-1888, PARTS I & II; and FIVE JusTicEs AND THE ELECrORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (1988).
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Law Professor William W. Crosskey.9 That these were not mere aca-
demic debates is shown by the fact that Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Bartkus alluded to Crosskey's work,10 and the efficacy of Fairman's
research was a matter of dispute in both Bartkus and Duncan."
While it appears that the work of Justice Black and Professor
Crosskey was completed independently,' 2 that of Justice Frankfurter
and Charles Fairman was one of mutual support and encouragement.
This article explores the Fairman/Frankfurter relationship against the
background of the incorporation debate and its relationship to the
lives of Justice Black and Professor Crosskey.
Part I discusses the shared values of Felix Frankfurter and
Charles Fairman, including their admiration for James Bradley
Thayer, Justice Miller, and Justice Bradley and their jaundiced view of
Reconstruction. Part II summarizes the relationship between Frank-
furter and Fairman during Fairman's developing career. Part III
presents a chronology of Fairman's most relevant Fourteenth Amend-
ment-related writings,' 3 developing the relationship between Fairman
and Frankfurter where documentation exists to do so. Part IV dis-
cusses the last years of Justice Black, Professor Crosskey, Justice
Frankfurter, and Professor Fairman. Part V concludes with a search
for the meaning we can draw from this research.
II. SHARED VALUES
Both Frankfurter and Fairman were influenced by the work of
Harvard Law Professor James Bradley Thayer. Under Thayer's "rule
of administration," courts should defer to the judgments of the federal
legislature unless they are unmistakably wrong as a matter of constitu-
9. Crosskey's principal contribution is Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History, and the Con-
stitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1954).
Crosskey's academic credentials included Phi Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif. 4 WHO
WAS WHO IN AmRIcA 1055 (1968). John W. Davis, in whose firm Crosskey worked for several
years, was "reported to have said that Crosskey's mind was the best piece of legal equipment he
had ever encountered." Charles 0. Gregory, William Winslow Crosskey-As I Remember Him,
35 U. CI. L. REV. 243, 244 (1968).
10. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
11. 1& at 140-49; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. There is no record of any correspondence between Professor Crosskey and Justice
Black in Justice Black's papers. HUGO LAFAYETrE BLACK: A REGISTER OF His PAPERS IN THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1982).
13. Fairman's writings on international law and military law are generally outside the scope
of this article, but will be cited where appropriate. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MAR-
TIAL RuLE (1930; rev. ed. 1943).
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tional law.14 Whether Thayer's views were original, influenced by his
former law partner Justice Holmes, or a codification of a tradition
stretching back to Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw, 15 there can be no
doubt that Thayer's views codified a core of Felix Frankfurter's views
on constitutional law.16 Frankfurter himself suggested that Thayer's
1893 article entitled The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law' 7 was the most important piece of writing on con-
14. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893).
15. For a discussion of James Bradley Thayer, his work, and his influence on Justice Frank-
furter and others see the 468-page Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The
Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
In some ways, the most remarkable aspect of Thayer's "rule of administration" is that it has
any potency at all. Thayer's own terminology, a "rule of administration," eschews any reliance
upon the normal interpretative aids: text, structure, intent, or precedent. See Thomas C. Grey,
Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on its Origin, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 28, 31
(1993) (indicating that, both in his 1894 article and in his casebooks, Thayer ignored or "down-
played" precedents contrary to his view and treated those supporting his view as if they were
"well-established law."); G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
48, 76 n.117 (1993) ("Most of Thayer's citations involved dissenting opinions, statements from
his own Gilded Age contemporaries, or positions that were later repudiated by the judges who
advanced them.")
Instead, Thayer crafted a theory about how the Constitution should operate, which was
based upon his own personal and political views. It has been suggested that mayer was ambiva-
lent not just about judicial review, but about the Constitution itself. Robin West, The Aspira-
tional Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241, 244 (1993). As Lawrence Sager has noted, "Thayer
never really offered persuasive reasons for the radical deference envisioned" by his rule. Law-
rence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 412 (1993).
16. While Thayer's personal preferences extended deference only to federal statutes, Frank-
furter's personal preferences extended deference to state statutes as well. It may be true that in
some instances Frankfurter's "greater" preference for deference went against his "lesser" prefer-
ence for specific results in specific cases. But in many instances, such as Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), Frankfurter's "greater" and "lesser" preferences coincided.
Frankfurter realized that his preference for "deference" had not been applied by two Chief
Justices he thought well of, Chief Justice John Marshall and Chief Justice Roger Taney. FELIx
FRANKFURTER, Tim COMMERCE CLAUSE 81 (1937). Frankfurter had to turn to Chief Justice
Morrison Waite as an example of one who "preeminently belongs to the tradition of judicial self-
restraint." Id.
In any event, it is important to point out that even Frankfurter's "greater" preference for
deference was nothing more than a personal preference. That he valued it more than the results
of some individual cases cannot take away the fact that Frankfurter's vote on the Court often
was "unconstrained" by an external source. Frankfurter simply had different preferences than
other members of the Court.
Mary Brigid McManamon has concluded that in spite of Justice Frankfurter's claims to be a
practitioner of judicial restraint, "he frequently declared new law, such as abstention, disregard-
ing legislative intent ...." Mary B. McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of 'Our Feder-
alism,' 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 788 n.552 (1993). Ultimately Professor McManamon's study of
Frankfurter's federal jurisdiction jurisprudence led her to the conclusion that: "Frankfurter's
ideas.., are one man's attempt to impose his view of the proper role of the Supreme Court on
our jurisprudence ..... Id at 788. See also id. at 748 ("Frankfurter's rewriting of the history of
pendent jurisdiction .... ); id. at 788 ("[Frankfurter] implemented his ideas by rewriting history
and ignoring legislative intent .... ) (footnotes omitted).
17. 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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stitutional law. 18 Indeed, Frankfurter has been termed "Thayer's most
prominent judicial disciple."'19
The evidence of Fairman's devotion to Thayer is not so clear. But
he did rely upon Thayer in his early writings.20 In 1949, Fairman indi-
cated that Thayer's "basic conception" for his 1895 casebook 2' was
still "sound" and that Thayer's "execution attained a distinction which
no one that came after has approached."
22
Frankfurter and Fairman also shared great respect for two nine-
teenth century Supreme Court Justices, Justice Samuel F. Miller and
Justice Joseph P. Bradley. The admiration for Justice Miller may have
existed, at least in part, because his opinions may have been among
those upon which Thayer built his theory of judicial restraint.
23
Thayer may have admired both Justice Miller and Justice Bradley
for another reason. Even in 1895, when his constitutional law
casebook was issued, monetary issues and questions of legal tender
loomed large for Thayer. Thayer devoted an entire chapter to,
"Money-weights and measures. '24 This included reprinting substan-
tial portions of Chief Justice Chase's opinion in Hepburn v. Gris-
wold,25 Justice Strong's opinion in the Legal Tender Cases,2 6 and
18. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 299-300 (1960).
19. Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 84, 120 (1993).
As has been frequently noted, Thayer limited his "rule of administration" to the federal
courts' review of federal legislation and explicitly provided for a non-deferential rule in the fed-
eral courts' review of state legislation. See Thayer, supra note 17, at 154-55; Wallace Mendelson,
The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31
VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 n.9 (1978).
Further, Thayer himself indicated that this was limited to an undefined "legislative action"
and did not apply to "questions of personal right under the Constitution, irrespective of any
legislation." Letter from James B. Thayer (Apr. 3, 1884), in THE NATION, Apr. 10, 1884, Corre-
spondence, at 314. The two examples Thayer gave were rights such as those discussed in Dred
Scott and rights which might arise under the Thirteenth Amendment. In those matters Thayer
indicated that the Court had the "simple duty of declaring the Court's own judgment upon the
meaning of the Constitution." Id.
Frankfurter extended Thayer's rule to apply to state legislation and refused to apply
Thayer's view on "personal rights." Whether one can so radically extend Thayer's "rule" and
still be a disciple of Thayer is open to question.
20. See e.g., Charles Fairman, The Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 HARV. L. REV. 397, 399
(1938) [hereinafter The Retirement of Federal Judges]; Charles Fairman, Justice Miller and the
Mortgaged Generation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 351, 363 n.40 (1938) [hereinafter Mortgaged Genera-
tion] (citing James B. Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1891)).
21. JAMES B. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) [hereinafter CASES].
22. Charles Fairman, Book Review, 1 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 617, 618 (1949) (reviewing
HENRY ROTrSCHAEFER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1948)).
23. White, supra note 15, at 54 (citing Miller's opinions in Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1866), and Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870)).
24. 2 CASES, supra note 21, at 2192-2273.
25. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). 2 CASES, supra note 21, at 2222-36 (reprinting 15 pages of
the opinion).
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Justice Gray's opinion in Juilliard v. Greenman,27 in addition to seven
pages of his own notes. 28 These issues continued to have at least sym-
bolic importance to supporters of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
like Fairman and Frankfurter, because of Roosevelt's action in taking
the United States off the gold standard.29
Justice Miller voted to affirm the use of greenbacks as legal
tender in both Hepburn30 and the Legal Tender Cases.31 Justice Brad-
ley, who was appointed after Hepburn, upheld the constitutionality of
the use of greenbacks as legal tender in the Legal Tender Cases.32 In
addition to the fact that resolving such a question in favor of the legis-
lative decision was congenial to Thayer's rule of administration,
Thayer himself had been publicly and politically active in supporting
the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act.
33
This alone might have been enough to endear Justices Miller and
Bradley to Thayer, Frankfurter, and Fairman. 34 But there was more.
26. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 2 CASES, supra note 21, at 2237-54 (reprinting 18 pages of
the opinion).
27. 110 U.S. 421 (1884). 2 CASES, supra note 21, at 2255-67 (reprinting 13 pages of the
opinion).
28. 2 CASES, supra note 21, at 2267-73. The other main cases treated in this chapter were:
The Miantinomi, 17 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 9,521) (weights and measures) (cov-
ered on pages 2192-95 of Thayer's casebook); Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830) (bills
of credit) (covered on pages 2199-2205 of Thayer's casebook); Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) (bills of credit) (covered on pages 2207-15 of Thayer's casebook);
Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229 (1868) (legal tender for debt) (covered on pages 2215-22
of Thayer's casebook).
29. See generally Phanor J. Eder, The Gold Clause Cases in the Light of History, Part One,
23 GEo. L.J. 359 (1935); Kenneth W. Dam, From The Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commis-
sion: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 504 (1983); Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitu-
tional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1923-26 (1994).
30. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
31. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). Miller supported the constitutionality of the Legal Tender
Act with "undeviating pertinacity." Charles Fairman, Justice Samuel F Miller, 50 POL. SC. Q.
15, 24 (1935).
32. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
33. White, supra note 15, at 65.
34. Fairman spent a considerable part of his academic life writing about Miller and Bradley.
See CiiARLEs FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1939); Charles
Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1128 (1941); Fairman, supra note 2; Charles Fairman, The So-called Granger
Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 578 (1953) [hereinafter Granger Cases];
Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, in MR. JUSTICE (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland
eds., 1956; rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter Mr. Justice Bradley]; see also CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 His-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF rHE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-
88, PART 1 (1971), PART 11 (1987) [hereinafter FAIRMAN ON RECONSTRUCTION]; FIVE JUSTICES
AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (1988) [hereinafter FIVE JUsTICES].
Fairman viewed Miller as "[g]reat in spirit, in mental power, in sense of right, and in patriot-
ism, he was indeed a strong judge." Charles Fairman, Samuel F. Miller, Justice of the Supreme
Court, 1862-1890, 10 VAND. L. REV. 193, 208 (1957). Bradley was one of Fairman's "favorite"
Justices. Fairman, supra note 2, at 49.
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In light of the New Deal efforts to use the Commerce Clause to sus-
tain the regulation of business and labor, Frankfurter and Fairman had
a deep interest in the Interstate Commerce Clause. 35 To their mind,
Bradley staked out a judicial position which would have sustained the
New Deal legislation.36
Further, Miller and Bradley were generally in favor of allowing
the states to regulate railroads, grain-elevators, and other corporate
entities with little or no judicial oversight through the Due Process
Clause.37 Again, such an approach was highly congenial to an issue of
Fairman and Frankfurter's time: the New Deal attempts to solve eco-
nomic problems by regulation without fear of invalidation under sub-
stantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era.38
Moreover, both Fairman and Frankfurter applauded the actions
of Justice Miller and, eventually, Justice Bradley,39 in nullifying the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, lim-
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. In 1937, Frankfurter described the ideas underlying the Commerce Clause decisions of
the Marshall, Taney, and Waite Courts as having "persisting vitality." FRANKFURTER, supra note
16, at 2. Waite's decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), was said to have "laid the
foundation for Congressional entry into fields of comprehensive regulations of economic enter-
prise." FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 83. Fairman later showed that Bradley played a critical
role in that decision.
In 1947, Frankfurter indicated that Chief Justice Hughes said Bradley was "one of the really
great intellects in the history of the Court." FELIX FRANKFURTER, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 312 (Joseph D. Lash ed., 1975) [hereinafter DIAIES]. According to Frankfurter,
"[w]e found ourselves in entire agreement about Bradley." ld See also Felix Frankfurter, Chief
Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 888 (1953) ("one of the keenest, profoundest intel-
lects that ever sat on that bench").
In 1950, Fairman attributed the benefits of a "nation-wide economy" to the decisions of
Justice Bradley and the decisions of the 1870s and 1880s. Fairman, supra note 2, at 70. Fairman
identified as Bradley's last opinion a dissent in Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway, 142 U.S. 217,230
(1891) (Bradley, J., dissenting), where Bradley "anticipated what was to become the view of the
Court in the application of the commerce clause." The Retirement of Federal Judges, supra note
20, at 426. See also Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34 (Bradley was "a great figure in the law of
the Commerce Clause.").
37. E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
38. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. Bradley initially felt that the Bill of Rights formed the core of the privileges and immu-
nities of U.S. citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting); Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n
v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870)
(No. 8,408) (Justice Bradley and Justice Wood's opinion); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81
(S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282) (Justice Wood's opinion). For a discussion of Justice Bradley's
correspondence with Judge Wood in the Hall case and Bradley's influence upon the outcome of
that opinion, see John P. Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 103,
108-09 (1963) and Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 310 n.31 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
But, Bradley later repudiated his initial understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and played a
key role in the Compromise of 1876. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 99-102 (1993) (on the change in Justice Bradley).
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iting the scope of its Equal Protection Clause, and trying to limit the
scope of the Due Process Clause.
Thus, Fairman and Frankfurter's personal preferences became in-
terwoven with their respect for Professor Thayer and their admiration
of Justices Miller and Bradley. Any analysis which furthered the repu-
tations of Justices Miller and Bradley also reinforced Thayer's theory
and gave legitimacy to the attempts of Fairman and Frankfurter to
apply those decisions to their own era.4o
Finally, Fairman and Frankfurter were both educated while the
"Dunning" school of history was predominant. 41 They both had a
jaundiced view of Reconstruction and of the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment.42
While this "Dunning" account of the era which produced the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments may not have
been exceptional for the average American of the 1940s, there were
other works of historical value which one might expect highly edu-
cated people like Fairman and Frankfurter to be acquainted.43
40. Likewise, any criticism of those Justices weakened Thayer's theory and threatened the
legitimacy of the attempts by Fairman and Frankfurter to apply those decisions to their own era.
41. William A. Dunning's books "embodied" the "mythic white view of the horrors of Re-
construction." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SouTHERN CULTURE 208 (Charles R. Wilson & William Fer-
ris eds., 1989).
42. In 1945, Frankfurter, in conjunction with Justices Jackson and Roberts, concluded that
"much... legislation was born of that vengeful spirit which to no small degree envenomed the
Reconstruction era." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (Frankfurter, Jackson, Roberts,
JJ., dissenting).
Fairman, noting that the Republican Party appointed members of that party to federal
judgeships in the South, stated that, "Federal justice in the former Confederate states smelled of
the carpetbag." CsiARLEs FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 139 (1948).
In his introductory note to the discussion of The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873), Fairman's summary of "Reconstruction" was as follows:
In the South, where these Amendments were to find their immediate application,
the state of affairs was pleasing from no point of view. The Republicans, who domi-
nated the national government, had as their adherents the Negroes, the carpetbaggers
who had moved in after the war, and a few long-suffering Southern Unionists-a com-
bination which was weak, inexperienced, often corrupt.
Id. at 308. Similarly, the Louisiana monopoly was referred to as "a particularly odious piece of
carpetbag administration." Id. at 289.
In 1956, in writing about protecting "the people of the South against victimization by the
Republican carpetbaggers," Fairman may have intended to limit his comments to the specific
situation underlying the New Orleans Slaughter-House monopoly. But he did not articulate
such a limitation. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34. Fairman referred to the Louisiana legisla-
ture as "carpet-bag and quite malodorous." Fairman, supra note 2, at 77.
43. E.g., JoH-n' R. LYNCH, THE FAcrs OF RECONSTRUCTION (1913); John R. Lynch, Some
Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes, 2 J. NEoRO HIST. 345 (1917); John R. Lynch, More
About the Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes, 3 J. NEGRO HIsT. 144 (1918); John R. Lynch,
The Tragic Era, 16 J. NEGRO HIST. 103 (1931).
W.E.B. Du Bois, Reconstruction and Its Benefits, 15 AM. HIsT. REV. 781 (1910); W.E.B. Du
Bois, The Freedmen's Bureau, 87 ATLAN'nC MoNrHuv 354 (1901); W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935).
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III. PROFESSOR FAIRMAN AND PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER
Felix Frankfurter joined the Harvard law faculty in 1914. He
taught there until appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939. In 1938,
an S.J.D. degree from Harvard was conferred upon Charles
Fairman.44
Fairman's career did not take an ordinary path. Born in 1897 in
Alton, Illinois, Fairman was fifteen years younger than Frankfurter. 45
Fairman was already forty or forty-one years old when he received his
Harvard law degree. He received an A.B. from the University of Illi-
nois in 1918. 6 He received an A.M. from that same institution in 1920
and taught at a private school from 1920 to 1923.47 He received a
Penfield Traveling Fellowship from the University of Pennsylvania in
1925 and studied at the University of Paris in 1925 and 1926.48
Harvard awarded him a Ph.D. in 1926.
49
From 1926 to 1928, he was an Assistant Professor of Government
at Pomona College in California.50 From 1928 to 1930, he was a lec-
turer on Government at Harvard. It is unknown whether Frankfurter
and Fairman met during this time. In 1930, Fairman became an Assis-
tant Professor of Political Science at Williams College in Massachu-
setts and held that position until 1936. 51 In 1933 and 1934, he held a
Carnegie Fellowship in International Law and studied at the Univer-
sity of London where he received an LL.B. in 1934.52
Fairman returned to Harvard and was enrolled in the S.J.D. pro-
gram from September 2, 1936 until June 24, 1937.53 During this time
HENRY C. WARMOTH, WAR, POLITICS, AND RECONSTRUCTION (1930); JOHN M. LANGSTON,
FROM THE VIRGINIA PLANTATION TO THE NATIONAL CAPITOL (1894); Francis B. Simkins, New
Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction 5 J. S. HIsT. 49 (1939).
44. AALS DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS, 1987-88, at 322. Unless otherwise indicated, the bio-
graphical materials concerning Fairman are taken from the AALS DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS,
1987-88.
45. WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 959 (39th ed. 1976-77) [hereinafter WHo's WHO].
46. Id. Fairman also served as a corporal in the Illinois National Guard (1916-17) and as






52. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 373 (1967); 1 DIRECTORY OF AMER-
ICAN SCHOLARS 201 (Jacques C. Press ed., 7th ed. 1978).
53. Letter from Annie C. Bombard, Associate Registrar, Harvard Law School, to Richard
L. Aynes, Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law (Jan. 19, 1993).
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he was a Brandeis Research Fellow5 4 and took a course from Profes-
sor Felix Frankfurter in Federal Jurisdiction. 55
Fairman's dissertation was entitled Mr. Justice Miller and the
Supreme Court, 1862-1890. This was the same work and even the
same title as his 1939 biography of Justice Miller. Fairman was
awarded his S.J.D. on June 23, 1938.56
By 1939, Professor Frankfurter had become Justice Frankfurter.
Frankfurter and his former student continued their friendship even
after they both left Harvard. 57 Beginning in 1940, the Court, often
through Justice Frankfurter's opinions, cited Fairman's work on Jus-
tice Miller and military and international law with approval.
58
Upon leaving Harvard in 1938, Fairman became an Associate
Professor, and later Professor of Political Science and Law, at Stan-
ford where he served until 1952.59 During World War II, Fairman held
a variety of law related positions in the U.S. Army, rising to the rank
of Colonel.6° From 1953 to 1955, Fairman held the Charles Nagel
54. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT at vi (1939) [here-
inafter FAIRMAN ON MILLER].
55. Id. It is possible that Fairman also audited Frankfurter's seminar in Administrative
Law. Letter from Annie C. Bombard, Associate Registrar, Harvard Law School, to Richard L.
Aynes, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law (July 8, 1994). Frank-
furter's classes were limited and "[o]pen only to students of high standing with the consent of the
instructor." HELEN S. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 14 (1960).
56. Letter from Annie C. Bombard, Associate Registrar, Harvard Law School, to Richard
L. Aynes, Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law (Jan. 19, 1993).
57. The Felix Frankfurter Papers held by the Harvard Library include exchanges between
Fairman and Frankfurter from 1938 to 1957. The collection of Frankfurter papers held by the
Library of Congress contains Frankfurter-Fairman correspondence from 1948-1957. Letter from
James H. Hutson, Chief, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (Dec. 21, 1992).
58. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 n.1 (unanimous opinion by Justice Frankfurter citing
FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54); Federal Power Comm'n. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America, 315 U.S. 575,609 (1942) (concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter citing FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 54); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 n.10, 315 n.11 (1946) (unani-
mous opinion by Justice Black citing FAIRMAN, supra note 13, 2d ed.); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 67 (1946) (dissent by Justice Rutledge citing FAIRMAN, supra note 13, 2d ed.); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 n.1 (1950) (unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson citing Charles
Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587
(1949)); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (unanimous opinion by Justice Frank-
furter citing FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54); Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 496 n.9 (1973) (majority opinion by Justice Brennan suggesting that Fairman's Some
New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, supra, was contrary to the result reached
by the court).
59. Fairman was an Associate Professor of Political Science (1938-41), a Professor of Polit-
ical Science (1941-53), and became affiliated with the law school in 1947 where he served as a full
Professor until 1953. WHO's WHO, supra note 45, at 959. In 1946, Fairman listed his title as
"Professor and Executive Head, Department of Political Science." Charles Fairman, Book Re-
view, 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 135, 138 n.* (1946) (reviewing KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL RECON-
STRUCTION (1946)).
60. SUTrHERLAND, supra note 52, at 373. Fairman's major assignments included the Interna-
tional Law Division of the Judge Advocate General's Office (1942-43), legal adviser in the Mili-
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Chair at Washington University in St. Louis. Fairman went on to be-
come a Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School where he taught
American Legal History from 1955 to 1962.61
Justice Frankfurter was not the only Supreme Court Justice
known by Fairman. Fairman also had direct contacts with Justice
Holmes, 62 Chief Justice Hughes, 63 Chief Justice Fiske Stone,64 Justice
Burton, 65 and Justice Robert Jackson.66 But it was Frankfurter who
was Fairman's teacher and mentor.
The ability to reconstruct the relationship between Fairman and
Frankfurter during these years is, as one would expect, hampered by
lack of complete documentation. For example, the existing letters
make reference to others which are not available. There is also no
accounting for the times when Fairman and Frankfurter may have met
face-to-face to discuss these matters. 6
7
But Felix Frankfurter himself pointed the way in circumstances
such as this. As he noted, "living long" with "literary forms, conveys
accents and nuances which the ear misses on a single reading, and
reveals meaning in silences." 68 In calling for "penetrating studies" of
the Justices of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter indicated that there
were sources beyond explicit words found in the Court's opinions.
"[A] hint here, a phrase there, an occasional letter appearing sixty
tary Government Section of Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean theater (July 1943-
Oct. 1944), and Chief of the International Law Division, Office of Judge Advocate General,
European Theater of Operations (Nov. 1944-Nov. 1945). President's Page, 1 STAN. L. REV. xi
(1949); Charles Fairman, Some Observations on Military Occupation, 32 MINN. L. REV. 319
(1948).
61. Charles Fairman 1891-1988, 40 HARv. L. BULL. 28 (1989). In 1960-61, Fairman held a
Guggenheim Fellowship. WHO's WHO, supra note 45, at 959.
62. MARK D. HowE, JusTicE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs 55 n.28 (1963) (referring to a
conversation Fairman had with Holmes in 1929 about an article by James B. Thayer).
63. DIARIES, supra note 36, at 312 (Chief Justice Hughes and Felix Frankfurter had each
been recently visited by Charles Fairman).
64. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Fairman (Mar. 13, 1945) quoted in ALP-mus
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE 716 (1956).
65. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 25, 1954) (on file with Library
of Congress) (complaining that Justice Burton never remembered him).
66. Charles Fairman, [Robert Jackson] Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 445, 453-54 n.30 (1955) (referring to Fairman's conversation with Justice Jackson over
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)); Mark Thshnet & Katga Lezin, What Really
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,1889 n.119 (1991) (quoting
letter from Justice Robert Jackson to Charles Fairman (Apr. 5, 1950)).
67. For example, Frankfurter, in an April 15, 1953 letter to Fairman, expressed his deep
"disappointment" that he missed Fairman when Fairman was "about the building the other day."
Frankfurter's calendar shows appointments with Professor Fairman possibly on April 21, 1954
(there is a question mark by this appointment) and on May 7, 1954; January 18, 1956; April 12,
1956; March 30, 1959; and September 23, 1964. Felix Frankfurter Collection (microfilm) (reels 1
and 2) (on file with the Library of Congress).
68. FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 9.
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years later, an innuendo in a public address, a revealing characteriza-
tion of a departed colleague-these are aids to understanding that
may impart meaning, if not always validity, to a seemingly wooden
doctrine."
69
Fairman too, in his comments upon a presentation by Justice
Frankfurter, suggested a similar approach. He indicated that Frank-
furter's comments were, "so rewarding, for what is omitted & what is
suggested & what one divines as well as for what is expressed. '70
Applying these standards to the public writings and private corre-
spondence of Fairman and Frankfurter one can learn much about
their relationship.
IV. THE FIRST HARVARD LAW REVIEW ARTICLE
In January of 1938, the Harvard Law Review published an article
by Charles Fairman. Authored during the height of the Roosevelt
"Court-packing" proposal, one suspects the hand of Felix Frankfurter
in this effort.71 The article is entitled The Retirement of Federal
Judges.72 This article began with the proposition that there is "general
agreement that it would probably be desirable to bring about earlier
retirement [of Supreme Court Justices] through a constitutional
amendment, '73 and proceeded to propose such an amendment and
support it both historically 74 and theoretically.
75
69. Id.
70. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 22, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress).
71. Roosevelt's plan was sent to Congress on February 5, 1937, but was considered to have
been defeated by mid-summer. LEO PFEFFER, Tins HONORABLE COURT 317, 321 (1965).
Professor Frankfurter was one of the people Roosevelt consulted on his strategy for dealing
with the Court. A proposal for the mandatory retirement of Justices at age 70 had been dis-
cussed by Roosevelt's advisors as early as January of 1936. See David E. Kyvig, The Road Not
Taken: For, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Amendment, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 463, 470-77
(1989). Whatever Frankfurter's views upon the merits of such a proposal, Fairman's effort may
have been a "trial balloon" to test professional sentiment on the proposal.
Frankfurter is thought to have had influence with the editors of the Harvard Law Review on
what student notes were actually published. McManamon, supra note 16, at 754. Thus, Frank-
furter may have not only helped Fairman with his article, but also influenced the decision of the
Review to publish it.
72. 51 HARV. L. REV. 397 (1938).
73. ld.
74. Fairman traced the history of Justices who were impaired or disabled while in office and
the practices in half of the states which required or induced judges to retire. Id. at 405-33.
75. Fairman offered a theoretical basis for such a requirement even if the Justices exper-
ienced no such physical or mental decline:
Rigidity of thought and obsolescence of social outlook, though more subjective, may be
no less real than the waning of bodily powers. When a majority of the Court cling to
views of public policy no longer entertained by the community or shared by the polit-
ical branches of government, a conflict arises which must be resolved.
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Fairman's proposed amendment would have allowed compen-
sated retirement at age sixty-five, required retirement at age seventy,
and made it possible for the President and the Senate to extend the
active service of a Justice to seventy-eight years.76 To avoid disrup-
tion, it was proposed that this provision be phased in so that no more
than two Justices per year would be required to retire.
77
V. JUSTICE MILLER
Fairman's next major publication was his biography of Justice
Miller, published in 1939.78 Among those to whom the biography ex-
tends thanks is Professor Felix Frankfurter for "constant encourage-
ment and stimulation in the execution of the work. ' 79 Support for the
biography's publication came from "the [Harvard] Law School Publi-
cation Fund."80
Fairman suggested that his interest in "judicial biography" ex-
tended back to at least 1929, while he was a lecturer in Government at
Harvard University.81 This raises the unanswered question of whether
Id at 398. Fairman did not explain why the conflict "must" be resolved, rather than being simply
viewed as a normal part of the separation of powers and checks and balances which make soci-
ety's progress slower than the majority would like.
76. Id. at 433.
77. Id. at 433-34. Fairman also made a provision for "termination", i.e. forced retirement
with compensation, upon proof of incapacity. Id. at 434.
The effect of Fairman's plan on the then-current Court is set forth in the following chart
prepared by John Zanghi:
Date of Age at
Mandatory Mandatory
Justice Birthdate Retirement Retirement
Louis D. Brandeis 11/13/1856 06/30/1938 81
James Clark McReynolds 02/03/1862 06/30/1938 76
George Sutherland* 03/25/1862 06/30/1939 77
Charles Evans Hughes 04/11/1862 06/30/1939 77
Pierce Butler 03/17/1866 06/30/1940 74
Benjamin N. Cardozo 05/24/1870 06/30/1940 70
Harlan Fiske Stone 10/11/1872 06/30/1942 70
Owen J. Roberts 05/02/1875 06/30/1945 70
Hugo L. Black 02/27/1886 06/30/1956 70
* Stanley Reed replaced George Sutherland on January 31, 1938.
78. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54.
79. Id. at vi. Professor Thomas Reed Powell was thanked for having read and critiqued the
entire manuscript. Id. Professor Edwin Merrick Dodd and Dean James M. Landis were thanked
for having commented upon the work. Id.
Even after he left Harvard, Fairman mailed one of his chapters to Frankfurter to review.
Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 10, 1938) (on file with Harvard Law
School).
80. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at vi.
81. Id. at v. Fairman's prior publications on Miller were Justice Samuel F. Miller and the
Barbourville Debating Society, 17 MIss. VALLEY HIsT. REV. 595 (1931); Fairman, supra note 31;
Mortgaged Generation, supra note 20. The first article was substantially reprinted in Chapter I,
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Frankfurter may have played a role in this interest. Fairman ex-
plained his choice of Miller as a subject in a very reasonable fashion:
Chief Justice Marshall had already been treated by many people,82 a
biography of Chief Justice Taney had recently been published,83 and
the period following the Civil War produced a variety of new issues,
including the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
But the logical biography to follow that of Chief Justice Marshall
and Chief Justice Taney would have been Taney's successor, Chief Jus-
tice Chase.85 There is no explicit explanation why Fairman chose not
to write the biography of Salmon P. Chase. Though Fairman referred
to Miller as a "towering" figure who "took a conspicuous part" in the
post Civil War issues,86 much the same could be said of Chief Justice
Chase.8
7
Chase had been a conspicuous national figure when Miller was a
complete unknownan Chase not only played a key role in formulating
the legal doctrines for the antislavery movement but he also enjoyed
an outstanding political career as Governor of Ohio, U.S. Senator,
and Secretary of the Treasury.89 While the Presidency eluded Chase,
he was an important factor and a serious candidate in every election
"The Country Doctor." The second article constitutes part of the conclusion of Fairman's biog-
raphy. The last article is the basis of Fairman's Chapter IX, "The Mortgaged Generation."
82. E.g. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THm LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919). One of those who
had devoted "attention" to Chief Justice Marshall was JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL
(1901).
83. CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935).
84. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at v. It is not clear that Fairman thought the
Fourteenth Amendment was the predominate issue: it is listed first, but Commerce Clause is-
sues, corporate management and railroad-aid bonds were part of the same sentence and termed
"legal issues of tremendous economic magnitude." I&
85. Ironically, Fairman was later selected to write the Holmes Devise which covered
Chase's term as Chief Justice. FAIRMAN ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 34, Part I.
As Gerhard Casper noted, Fairman failed to supply a sufficiently "comprehensive assess-
ment of a complex and difficult character." Indeed, Casper was forced to draw Fairman's "sum-
mary" of Chase from the negative implications contained in Fairman's positive assessment of
Waite. Gerhard Casper, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and
Reunion, 1864-88, Part One, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 913, 916 (1973) (book review).
86. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at v.
87. Indeed, many sources treating Chase find him to be a far more able and interesting
Chief Justice than one would conclude from Fairman's work. See e.g., David J. Bodenhamer,
Salmon Portland Chase, in Tim SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 101-06 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994);
STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLrrlcs (1968); David F.
Hughes, Salmon P. Chase: Chief Justice, 18 VAND. L REV. 569 (1965).
88. Fairman himself recounted the fact that in 1862, Miller's "reputation as a lawyer had not
even extended so far as Springfield, Illinois." Mortgaged Generation, supra note 20, at 355
(quoting Henry Strong, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, 1 ANNALS OF IOWA 241, 252 (3d ser.
1894)). Fairman also suggested that Miller was unknown outside of Iowa. Charles Fairman,
supra note 31, at 17.
89. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 136-37 (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 1992).
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from 1860 to 1872.90 According to G. Edward White, "Chase was by
all accounts one of the most formidable legal and political figures of
the antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction years." 91
There were obvious, if unstated, reasons for Fairman's selection
of Miller over Chase as a subject for his biography. Given Fairman's
views on Reconstruction, 92 he was not likely to have much respect for
antislavery theorists or lawyers like Chase. Also, Chase's openness
about his ambition for the Presidency was unseemly to Fairman.
93
Furthermore, Chief Justice Chase voted the "wrong" way on the legal
tender issues.94 Finally, Chase did not write any outstanding Com-
merce Clause cases or regulatory cases, thus his jurisprudence lacked
any 'relevance' to the issues of the 1930s.95 Thus, there were signifi-
cant, but unstated, reasons why Fairman rejected Chase as an interest-
ing subject for a biography and, instead, chose Miller.
In his biography of Miller, Fairman made no pretense that Miller
was following a nineteenth-century view of simply "finding" the law.
Indeed, he primarily praised Miller for his "statesmanship. ' 96 In 1938,
Fairman had characterized Miller as "an exemplar of the wisdom of
judicial forebearance. ' 97 Fairman saw the railroad bond cases
90. "[Chase was] a dominant figure in the history of the Civil War era. It is not enough to
say that he was one of the most important leaders of the Republican party. He was a preeminent
leader, a figure of immense proportions." Michael L Benedict, Salmon P. Chase as Jurist and
Politician: Comment on G. Edward White, Reconstructing Chase's Jurisprudence, 21 N. Ky. L.
REV. 133 (1993).
91. G. Edward White, Reconstructing the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase,
21 N. Ky. L. REV. 41 (1993). As summarized by White:
Abraham Lincoln said that Salmon Chase was "about one and a half times bigger than
any other man I ever knew." Justice Samuel Miller, Chase's colleague on the Supreme
Court of the United States, told his brother-in-law that he knew of "no one against
whom I should undertake to measure myself with more diffidence." Historian Allan
Nevins, writing in 1936, identified "three jurists of consummate ability" who had occu-
pied the position of chief justice of the United States from 1801 to 1873: John Marshall,
Roger B. Taney, and Salmon P. Chase.
Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
92. See supra note 42.
93. Chase was a "selfish" man because he was not content to be Chief Justice. "[W]anting
still more," he aspired to be President. Fairman, supra note 2, at 60.
94. Fairman also criticized Chase's efforts to resolve the cases before Strong and Bradley
were appointed to the Court. Id. at 96-97.
95. Felix Frankfurter said as much when he indicated that Chase's work "consists in the
main of fugitive and confused themes in the Supreme Court's symphonic evolution of the com-
merce clause." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WArrE 74 (1937).
96. See Fairman, supra note 31 (Because of the choices he made, Miller was "one of the
most significant makers of our constitutional law.").
Frankfurter was also attracted to "statesmanship." See FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT 542 (Philip Kurland ed., 1970) (indicating commitment to Thayer's "statesman-
like conception of the limits within which the Supreme Court should move").
97. Mortgaged Generation, supra note 20, at 356.
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through New Deal eyes, as a "phase of the great struggle between
farmers and taxpayers on the one hand and railroad promoters and
investors on the other. '98
Indeed, Fairman's admiration was not hidden when he recounted,
in his concluding chapter, that Miller had "set his face against making
the Fourteenth Amendment the basis for a Naturrecht."'99 Reflecting
the fixation of many of his generation with the Lochner era and the
Court's obstruction of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, 100 Fairman
counterpoised Miller's attempt to limit what Fairman saw as natural
law with the fact that a "Naturrecht" had been built "upon the dis-
senting opinions of Justice Field."' 0 '
Fairman's admiration for Miller was so great that Fairman lost his
ability for critical insight where Miller was concerned. Even where
Fairman recognized that Miller may have had personal views and in-
terests which predisposed him to take one point of view, Fairman's
respect for Miller's "candor and intellectual integrity preclude[d] any
facile assumption that he wished to twist the law" to that point of
view.102
98. Id. at 351.
99. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 425.
Fairman's early work acknowledged Miller's use of "limitations... which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments [and result in] [i]mplied reservations of individual
rights" was essentially part of a "natural" law concept. Fairman, supra note 2, at 28-29 (review-
ing Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875)). If Miller was rejecting natural law in
the Slaughter-House Cases, Fairman never explained why Miller utilized natural law in Topeka
concerning the authority of a municipality to issue bonds.
One may note that Fairman praised Miller for making sound judgments in reaching deci-
sions not spelled out by the constitution and called that activity "statesmanship", supra note 96,
but, at the same time, condemned many of Justice Field's judgments as "natural law."
Fairman never articulated any coherent theory to account for this tension. It may be, of
course, that these writings reflect nothing more than a view that anyone whose judgment differed
from Fairman's was applying natural law and anyone whose judgment agreed with Fairman's was
a "statesman."
It appears more likely, however, that coherence in Fairman's approach can be found in the
doctrine of judicial restraint with which his mentor, Felix Frankfurter, is most identified. Fair-
man's writings could be read as recognizing that the Courts make policy insisting that they do so
in incremental ways through a common law-like adjudication ("statesmanship") and rejecting
more sweeping policy making roles ("natural law").
100. The first public instance of Fairman equating natural law with substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment occurred in 1935. Charles Fairman, Book Review, 49 HARv.
L. REV. 166, 168 (1935) (reviewing HAROLD LAsi, THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE)
("Recall our experience with 'property' and 'liberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment.) (footnote
omitted) ("[H]as not the doctrine of natural rights served to entrench the privilegia of capital?").
101. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 425.
102. Id. at 352.
Though not marshalled in this fashion, the indications of possible influence upon Miller's
views in the railroad/municipal bond cases catalogued by Fairman are substantial.
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864), arose from Miller's home state of Iowa,
which was also within his Circuit, and he had, in Fairman's suggestive words, "sympathy for the
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VI. JUSTICE BRADLEY
Having completed his book on Miller, Fairman began his public
work on Bradley in the April 1941 and May 1941 issues of the
Harvard Law Review. 0 3 While these articles contained Fairman's
praise for Bradley, 1°4 their main goal was to refute the claim that
"Grant had appointed Bradley on the basis of a promise to sustain the
Legal Tender Act.' 0 5 After reviewing the historical evidence for over
ninety pages, Fairman concluded that Bradley did not himself make
any promises to Grant. 0 6 "When Mr. Justice Bradley came to the
tax-burdened people of Iowa." FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 352. Miller, though ap-
parently disqualifying himself in a case involving his home county (Lee), dissented in a compan-
ion case deciding the same issue. Id. at 366 n.60.
One of Miller's dissents was in a case in which his brother-in-law, with whom he was close,
was counsel for the losing party. Id. at 371. Shortly before his appointment to the bench, Miller
himself had been retained to argue some of these same types of cases before the United States
Supreme Court. Miller recognized that the outcome of some of these cases affected the value of
his own property. See also Fairman, supra note 2, at 32. Nevertheless, Fairman concluded that
"there can be no doubt that Miller's position in the bond litigation rested on far more substantial
considerations." FAIRmAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 374.
In contrast, Fairman found the fact that Justice Swayne, a leading member of the majority in
many of the bond cases, had been counsel for a railroad in at least one bond case in the Ohio
Courts in 1858, was "worth nothing." Id. at 372-73.
Further, Fairman never came to grips with the seeming inconsistency between Miller's ex-
pansive reading of the Constitution in cases such as Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655 (1875), Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890),
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and
Miller's refusal to give any meaning to the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). With respect to the former cases, as late as 1957
Fairman used that line of cases to show that Miller was a "strong" judge who had a "readiness to
enforce the reason and spirit of the Constitution." Charles Fairman, Samuel F. Miller, Justice of
the Supreme Court, 1862-1890, 10 VAND. L. REV. 193, 208 (1957) [hereinafter Samuel F Miller].
The difficulty lies in Fairman's inability to subject Miller-or Bradley-to what David L.
Lewis has called "sympathetic skepticism." DAVID L. LEwIs, W.E.B. Du Bois 33 (1993). This is
reflected in all of Fairman's work, but most explicitly stated in 1957: "Justice Miller knew him-
self. His character was not complicated. So his own writing are the best reflection of the man."
Samuel F. Miller, supra at 193 n.*.
One of the few instances in which any criticism of Miller surfaced is in Fairman, supra note
2, at 44 (suggesting in one case that Miller's legal history was "very probably" wrong, that his
"sharp" distinction between judicial and legislative power "seems doctrinaire and unrealistic"
and terming his 1888 speech on the conflict between socialism and organized society
"alarming").
103. Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 977-1034; 1128-55 (1941).
104. Id. at 977 (Bradley "had no superior as a lawyer among the members of the Supreme
Court during his term of service.").
105. Id.
106. However, Fairman established that Bradley spoke publicly in 1868 in support of "Na-
tional Legal Tender," id. at 989, and did not rule out the possibility that Bradley made other
public or private statements more fully supporting the constitutionality of the act. Fairman con-
cluded that Bradley's friend of more than 30 years, former New Jersey Senator Frederick Fre-
linghuysen, had long known "just where Bradley stood on the legal tender question" and that
Frelinghuysen "doubtless" told President Grant, with whom he was "on good terms," what he
knew about Bradley's views. Id. at 1141.
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Supreme Court he brought a powerful mind, a social conscience, and
complete freedom of judgment."'10 7
Fairman also quoted, from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish's diary, President Grant's re-
sponse to former Attorney General Hoar's request that Grant deny the charge that Bradley had
been appointed to the Court to uphold the Legal Tender Act. According to Fish, Grant indicated
"it would be difficult for him to make a statement." Grant said he had not required a "declara-
tion" from Judge Bradley on the issue, but "he had reason to believe Judge Bradley's opinion
tended" to be in the direction of upholding the Constitutionality of the act. Id. at 1132-33.
This leaves open a range of options from the possibility that Grant had simply read or been
told of Bradley's past statement and actions, to a possibility that someone like Frelinghuysen had
carried oral assurances to the President directly from Bradley.
107. Id. at 1155. In many ways, Fairman's proof was remarkably scant and, at least in some
instances, suggested that Bradley may have made such a commitment, if not to Grant, at least to
members of the Senate.
Fairman documented the fact that Bradley did make a written commitment to live in the
Circuit to which he was assigned if he was appointed to the Court. Fairman, id. at 1013-14
(quoting letter from Joseph Bradley to Senator Matthew H. Carpenter (Feb. 9, 1870)). In dis-
cussing the politics of the Senate appointment process, Fairman demonstrated that the Republi-
can Senators were "stirred up" over the legal tender question. Id. at 1016.
Frelinghuysen's February 16, 1870 letter to Bradley indicated that Senator Jacob Howard
had insisted upon "written evidence of how [Bradley] stood on important questions." Freling-
huysen gave that evidence to Howard in the form of a letter Bradley had written to George
Harding. Howard was "well satisfied." Senator Charles D. Drake, who had been a candidate
for the appointment to the Supreme Court and was apparently considered to be unreliable even
though he was a Republican, also wanted written evidence. But, Drake had to rely upon How-
ard's assurances, because "the letter was a dangerous instrument to use with Democrats around"
and Frelinghuysen refused to show it to Drake. Id at 1024.
Though there is "no trace" of this "missing letter," Fairman concluded that Bradley did not
make "a specific commitment on any judicial question." Id at 1025. Under the circumstances,
Fairman proved little more than that there was no express, written commitment to President
Grant on the legal tender question. Whether, however, there was such a commitment to the
Senate, or whether Grant or others relied upon commitment of Bradley's key supporters, is not
given thoughtful consideration by Fairman in his article.
There are other areas which a thoughtful biographer should explore. For example, Fairman
indicated that Bradley was not just the attorney, but also part of the "management" as a Direc-
tor and Secretary of the allegedly corrupt Camden and Amboy Railroad. Id. at 982. The ques-
tion of how Bradley could be part of the management team and still avoid the taint of corruption
might well bear investigation.
Fairman recounted Bradley's post-appointment sale to Frelinghuysen of Bradley's stock in
various railroads for $26,748. Id. at 1129. Fairman apparently viewed this as an attempt by
Bradley to divest himself of stock which could create a conflict of interest. But Fairman never
compared Bradley's sale price to the market value of the stock. Without this information, it is
impossible to determine whether it was equivalent to an arms length transaction. This informa-
tion could open or close the door of investigation to a careful biographer.
Finally, there is an intriguing reference to a delay of the vote on Bradley's appointment to
the Court because of a desire to press a bill, the strength of which united "with it the Southern
vote and Cameron and national R.R. interests." Id. at 1031. The Southern vote and Cameron
were opposed to Bradley's appointment to the Court. If the "national" railroad interests were
also opposed to Bradley or even if there was a distinction between "national railroad interest"
and the "local" Camden and Amboy interests with which Bradley was associated, then Fairman's
celebration of Bradley's later voting against what seemed to be the railroad interests, e.g. FAin-
MAN ON RECONSTRUCrnON, supra note 34, at 359, may have been misplaced.
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VII. ADAMSON V. CALIFORNIA
While Fairman was working on biographical studies of Justice
Bradley, Justice Frankfurter confronted a major crisis in the Court.
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide
the case of Adamson v. California.l08 This case involved the question
of whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the state from im-
plementing state constitutional and statutory provisions allowing a
prosecutor or a court to comment upon a criminal defendant's failure
to testify. The majority of the Court, acting through Justice Stanley F.
Reed, focused upon the right against self-incrimination itself-rather
than the question of whether such a comment infringed upon it-and
concluded that it was "settled law" that the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion did not apply to the states. 109
Justice Black dissented and was joined by Justices Douglas, Mur-
phy and Rutledge." 0 Black's dissent was based upon a historical
reading of the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black recog-
nized that Twining v. New Jersey"' was precedent for rejecting the
Fifth Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment claim." 2 But he was not
prepared to give deference to that case or ones related to it, because
the historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn Bar-
ron v. Baltimore" 3 had "never received full consideration or exposi-
tion in any opinion of this Court interpreting the Amendment."" 4
108. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
109. Id. at 50. In 1965, in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination to the states.
110. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68 (Black, J., with whom Justice Douglas concurs), 123 (Murphy,
J., with whom Justice Rutledge concurs). While Murphy dissented separately, he indicated that
he was in "substantial agreement" with Justice Black. The "one reservation and addition" of-
fered by Murphy was that the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment not only
included the Bill of Rights, but could also include other rights as well. Id at 123-24.
According to Justice Black's wife, Elizabeth Black, the Justice considered the Adamson
dissent his "most powerful-and the one that had the most effect." HUGo L. BLACK & ELIZA-
BETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRs. BLACK 73 (1986).
111. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
112. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69-70.
113. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
114. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 72. In addition to Twining, Black also referred to Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Black traced the history of the attempts to use the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
state action. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 78-79. Exemplifying the same fears of unrestrained judicial
action as Justice Frankfurter, Black related a history in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
interpreted to avoid its intended enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states and, at the
same time, its due process clause was expanded to give the Court the ability to use a "natural
law" to invalidate regulatory legislation. Id. at 82-83.
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Black's historical evidence was contained largely in the thirty-
page Appendix to his dissenting opinion.115 Black found that the au-
thor of the Fourteenth Amendment and its "floor manager" in the
House of Representatives, John Bingham, indicated that it was
designed to overrule Barron and provide for the enforcement of the
Bill of Rights against the states.116 Similarly, Senator Jacob Howard, a
member of the Joint Committee which reported the amendment out
and the "floor manager" for the amendment in the Senate, specifically
stated that it was designed to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states.'1
7
Justice Black provided the first comprehensive judicial survey of
the Congressional debate, the interrelationship with other legislation
such as the Freedman's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill," 8 the
views of other relevant members of Congress" 9 and President John-
son,120 cases in which Justices of the United States Supreme Court had
individually held that the Bill of Rights applied to the states,' 21 and
relevant secondary sources. 22
Black argued that the majority's due process position was nothing more than the Justices's
view of "natural law." Id. at 70.
115. Id. at 92-123.
116. Almost every page of Justice Black's Appendix contains some reference to or quotation
from John Bingham.
For biographical information on Bingham see Richard L. Aynes, The Anti-slavery and Abo-
litionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 881 (1987); Richard L. Aynes,
The Impeachment and Removal of Tennessee Judge West Humphries: John Bingham's Prologue to
the Johnson Impeachment Trial, 2 GA. J. S. LEGAL HIST. 71 (1993).
117. References to Senator Howard are found in Adamson, 332 U.S. at 104-07.
118. Id. at 99-102, 107-08.
119. Representative Hale, id. at 98; Senator Trumbull, id. at 99; Representative Raymond, id.
at 56; House Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson, id. at 100, 102-03; Representative Thaddeus
Stevens, id. at 103-04; Rep. Shanklin, id. at 108; Representative Garfield, id. at 110-11; and Rep-
resentative Dawes, id. at 118-20.
120. Id. at 103.
121. By Black's count, at least six Justices concluded, prior to the four dissenters in Adam-
son, that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Bradley and Swayne, JJ., dissenting);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (Field and Clifford, JJ., dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323 (1892) (Field, Harlan, and Brewer, JJ., dissenting); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
For an intriguing suggestion that the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases also held that
the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable against the states, see Robert C.
Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 739. My reasons for rejecting this reading of Jus-
tice Miller's opinion are set forth in Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice
Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 627
(1995).
122. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 109 (citing BENJAMIN KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
CoMMrrrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUcrION (1914)); id. at 72, 110 (citing HORACE FLACK,
TIE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENIH AMENDMENT (1908)).
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Justice Reed's majority opinion dealt directly with Justice Black's
position by invoking precedent from Barron to Twining and indicating
that the reading that the Bill of Rights was not a privilege or immunity
against the states "has heretofore found favor with the majority of this
Court as a natural and logical interpretation.' 23 With respect to the
due process claim, Justice Reed invoked Palko v. Connecticut124 as a
precedent which still made sense.
125
In spite of the majority's rejection of Black's claim on both privi-
leges and immunities and due process grounds, Justice Frankfurter felt
constrained to write a concurring opinion. 26 Mark Tushnet has sug-
gested that Frankfurter's concurrence was "[p]rovoked by Black's
confidence in original intent" and an apparent belief that Reed's opin-
ion was an inadequate response to Black. 127
Because Frankfurter's concurrence is central to some of the
shared values of Fairman and Frankfurter, and because it provided the
seeds for Fairman's 1949 article, it merits extended discussion.
A. Frankfurter's Personal Preferences
with Respect to the Fourteenth Amendment
To understand Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson, one
must first understand his views of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Frankfurter's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment began
with the belief that the amendment should have never been adopted.
In 1924, in an unsigned article in The New Republic, Frankfurter
took the position that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clauses gave the courts power which they could not safely exer-
cise and that "[tihe due process clauses ought to go."' 28 Four years
123. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 53.
124. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
125. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 54. In addition, the majority indicated that "[niothing has been
called to our attention that either the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or the states that
adopted [it] intended its due process clause to draw within its scope the earlier amendments to
the Constitution." id.
126. Id. at 59. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
127. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv.
747, 753 (1992).
128. The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, Tim NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1924, at 110, 113. In the
body of the essay Frankfurter linked "due process" and "equal protection" together as clauses
which produced "judicial nullification" and raised barriers "against utilizing the inherent flex-
ibilities of our Constitution for the adaption of our traditional legal system to modem needs." Id.
at 111. He did not, however, explicitly call for the repeal of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
For Frankfurter's authorship of this article see FELUX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT-EXTRAUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 158 (Philip B. Kur-
land ed., 1970).
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later, the landmark book, The Business of the Supreme Court, which
Frankfurter co-authored, referred to Reconstruction as having added
"drastic limitations against the states [which] were written into the
Federal Constitution."'129 Later, Frankfurter wrote that, "I once
shocked Cardozo by saying that I would favor the repeal of that
Amendment-and had wished that only the XIII and XV had issued
from the Civil War.'
130
Given the existence of an amendment he disliked, Frankfurter ex-
pressed the desire to avoid giving the amendment any meaning. "I
wished that when the Amendment first came before the Court it had
concluded that it was too vague, too much open to subjective interpre-
tation for judicial enforceability.' 131 In Morton Horwitz's words,
Frankfurter treated the whole Fourteenth Amendment "as one undif-
ferentiated 'misfortune. "1 32
Thus, the beginning of Frankfurter's Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence was a contempt for the framers of the amendment, 33 a
belief that the amendment was not necessary, and a hope that it could
be judicially construed so as to have no enforceable effect. This is not
an auspicious beginning for a fair attempt to give meaning to the
amendment. But this background explains why Frankfurter celebrated
129. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, TmE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 58-
59 (1928) (emphasis added).
130. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (June 25, 1954) (Hand papers on file
with Harvard Law School Library), quoted in MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 259 (1992).
131. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Feb. 13, 1958), quoted in HORwTrz,
supra note 130, at 259-60. This is consistent with Frankfurter's November 13, 1943 letter to
Justice Black:
Once you go beyond a procedural content [to the Fourteenth Amendment] and pour
into the generality of the language substantive guarantees it is to me inconceivable that
any kind of definition of the substantive rights of the guarantee will not repeat in the
future the history of the past, namely will according to the makeup of the Court give
varying scope to the substantive rights that are protected.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo Black (Nov. 13, 1943) (Frankfurter collection on file
with Harvard), quoted in JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIx FRANK-
FURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 174 (1989). Black's total incorporation
view did, however, set limits which Frankfurter claimed were impossible.
132. HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 340 n.83.
133. See supra note 42. This sentiment was apparently shared by Frankfurter's friend and
ally Justice Robert Jackson. According to Tinsley Yarbrough's summary of Justice Murphy's
conference notes on Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), Jackson stated that he "had no feeling
for the sanctity of the fourteenth amendment, a constitutional provision adopted during what he
termed the 'most scandalous and lousy period in' the nation's history." Tmsley E. Yarbrough,
Justice Black, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Incorporation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 231, 243
(1976) (referring to Justice Murphy's conference notes on Betts (Frank Murphy papers on file
with Michigan Historical Collection, University of Michigan)).
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the fact that the Slaughter-House Cases had made the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a nullity.
13
B. Frankfurter's Concurring Opinion
Though not first chronologically, the foundation of Frankfurter's
entire opinion was his refusal to discuss the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Black was careful to draw upon the
provisions of Section One "separately, and as a whole" so as to claim
a result under either the Privileges and Immunities Clause or Due
Process Clause.135 Yet it is clear from reading Black's Appendix that
his legislative history dealt almost exclusively with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
Frankfurter's response was to avoid any discussion of that clause.
In a parenthetical he said that his opinion focused "solely" on the Due
Process Clause. "I put to one side the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of that Amendment.' 36
By limiting his discussion to the Due Process Clause, Frankfurter
avoided any direct confrontation with the bulk of Justice Black's evi-
dence. This approach also allowed Frankfurter to make his argument
that of forty-three judges who had passed upon questions concerning
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, only one
"eccentric exception", Justice Harlan, had suggested that the Due Pro-
cess Clause had incorporated the Bill of Rights.' 37 While Frank-
furter's statement was technically correct when limited to the Due
Process Clause, if those Justices who reached the same result under
134. In contrast, the Court's decision is currently viewed far more negatively. "The decision
mocks congressional efforts to nationalize protection of the basic civil rights of former slaves."
Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextual Illusion of a Color-Blind Constitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 343, 359
(1994) (reviewing ANDREw KuLL, Tsm COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)).
135. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947).
136. Id. at 61-62. "For the mischievous uses to which that clause would lend itself if its scope
were not confined to that given it by all but one of the decisions beginning with the Slaughter-
House Cases...." Id
The one exception cited was Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), which Frankfurter
noted was overruled in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). Of course, as Frankfurter well-
knew, the effect of this line of cases was to render the clause a nullity. But this was consistent
with his personal desire that the entire amendment not exist.
137. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62. Frankfurter had used this same tactic in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,664-65 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (indicat-
ing that in five previous flag salute cases, 44 of the 45 votes had been cast in favor of upholding
the requirement, and invoking the names of Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Brandeis, and Justice
Cardozo).
Barnette was an exemplar of Frankfurter's plea for judicial deference to the legislative pro-
cess and included a quote of almost three pages from James Bradley Thayer. Id. at 667-70.
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause, eschewed by Frankfurter, were
added, that number would rise to at least six. 138
Similarly, Frankfurter's well-known statement that the Four-
teenth Amendment is "a strange way of saying" the Bill of Rights
applies to the states139 is true only if one focuses, as he did, upon the
Due Process Clause. It is quite natural to think of the Bill of Rights as
outlining the "rights" (privileges and immunities) of U.S. citizens. 4
°
Frankfurter could use that rhetorical device only by limiting his argu-
ment to the Due Process Clause.
Furthermore, Frankfurter's use of the term "mischief' is re-
vealing. He never suggested in any persuasive fashion that the Slaugh-
ter-House Court was "correct" in any textual, intentional, originalist,
precedential or even moral sense. He only suggested that his personal
feeling was that some unidentified "mischief' would have happened if
they had not held the Privileges and Immunities Clause to be a nullity
and that the Court's result therefore met with his personal
preferences. 1
4'
After attacking an argument not made-that there was a "hid-
den" meaning to the amendment' 42 -Frankfurter turned to analysis
which revealed some of his real reasons for adopting his view. Frank-
138. Minnesota Judge Edward F. Waite found Frankfurter's reference to Harlan "extremely
distasteful" because it amounted to a personal criticism of Justice Harlan. Edward F. Waite,
How "Eccentric" Was Mr. Justice Harlan, 37 MINN. L. REV. 173, 173 (1953). Judge Waite's arti-
cle suggested that Justice Frankfurter mischaracterized Harlan's views and counted Chief Justice
Chase, Justices Field, Bradley, Swayne, and Brewer as Justices who had historically articulated
views "similar" to Harlan. Id. at 180.
Frankfurter's strained attempt to imply eccentricity to Harlan (and to the Justice Black Mi-
nority) is more suggestive of his role of an advocate than that of a scholar or impartial member
of the judiciary.
139. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 63.
140. Even Justice Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), spoke of the rights
protected by the Bill of Rights as "privileges and immunities." 302 U.S. at 324-25.
In 1891, Charles R. Pence thought the "natural" construction of the privileges and immuni-
ties of the Fourteenth Amendment was that they referred to the Bill of Rights. Charles R. Pence,
The Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 536, 540 (1891).
During the pendency of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, John Norton Pomeroy,
Dean of the Law School and Professor of Political Science at the University of New York au-
thored AN INTRODUCION TO THm CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1868). Pome-
roy urged the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a way to make the Bill of Rights
enforceable against the States. Id. at 149-51. Pomeroy referred to "the privileges and immunities
contained in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 147. See also JOHN W. BURGESS, 1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITTONAL LAW 184 (1891) (describing the Bill of Rights as "a bill of
immunities") and Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) ("the privileges and immuni-
ties contained in the Bill of Rights.).
141. Frankfurter distorted the issues before the Court by taking arguments which naturally
flowed from the privileges and immunities clause and demonstrating their inapplicability to the
due process clause. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62-64.
142. Id. at 63-64.
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furter disavowed any search for the intent of Congress143 and claimed
that the best reading of the intent of the amendment was the view of
"judges at the time."'"4
This was not a philosophical view or a tenet of Frankfurtian con-
struction, but rather a tactic to achieve a desired result. In a dissent-
ing opinion in 1951, Frankfurter indicated that "[i]t has never been
questioned in this Court that committee reports, as well as statements
by those in charge of a bill . . . are authoritative elucidations of the
scope of a measure."'145 He relied upon statements upon the floor of
Congress in his other opinions.'" His later reliance upon Charles
Fairman's study of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 47 suggests that it was the result of Black's legislative history,
and not the use of legislative history itself, to which Frankfurter
objected.
Without citation, Frankfurter claimed that half of the states at the
time of ratification did not have "the rigorous requirements of the
Fifth Amendment for instituting criminal proceedings through a grand
jury." 1' Frankfurter could not imagine that these states would ratify
the amendment if it meant having to use a grand jury.'
49
143. Id. at 64.
144. id Frankfurter's approach is illustrated by his exchange with Spottswood Robinson in
the December 7, 1953 argument in Briggs v. Elliot
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Do you think we can get out of the debates
anything more than Mr. Justice Miller got out of them at the time of the Slaughter-
House Cases?
MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think so, Mr. Justice Frankfurter....
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: And the understanding you get or you think we
ought to get goes beyond the terms which Justice Miller put it in the Slaughter-House
Cases.
49A LANDMARK BRIES AND ARoUMErNTs 458-59 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975).
Even Frankfurter's former law clerk and disciple, Alexander Bickel, determined that the
Congressional debates had a presumption of giving the best view of the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ALEXANDER M. BicKEi, PoLrncs AND THE WARREN CouRT 214 (1965).
145. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1951).
146. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 447 (1955) (quoting Senator Robert Taft on the purpose of an amendment to the Labor
Management Relations Act); Palermo v. United States, 300 U.S. 343, 350 (1959) (indicating that
committee reports and "the floor debates" clearly showed intent).
147. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
148. Adamnson, 332 U.S. at 64.
149. Frankfurter's underlying concern may have been his own disdain for the protection
claimed by a grand jury of the Fifth Amendment and the civil trial by jury of the Seventh
Amendment. See id. at 64-65. Indeed, Frankfurter referred to the Bill of Rights, or at least the
jury provisions, as mere "legal forms" from the Eighteenth Century. Id. at 66.
Frankfurter also argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment could not
include all the Bill of Rights or the other Amendment would be unnecessary. This being the
case, and observing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is worded the
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Frankfurter also invoked the precedent of Palko v. Connecticut5 °
with far more eloquence and respect than Reed, counting the numer-
ous and great names in support of that precedent.' 5'
Finally, Frankfurter revealed what might have been his primary
motivation in his discussion of the rights at issue as a "technical rule of
law" which is contrary to common sense: it prevented jurors from do-
ing what "[s]ensible and right-minded men" do in "important affairs
of life" and that is to take silence into consideration. 52
C. Frankfurter's Frustration
But Frankfurter did not dispute, and perhaps could not dispute,
Black's powerful originalist argument. This must have been particu-
larly frustrating for Frankfurter. He viewed Black as an evil person
who was unfit to be upon the Court, 53 in part because of what Frank-
furter viewed as Black's being "undisciplined by adequate profes-
sional learning and cultivated understanding.' 54
same as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he argued that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include all the Bill of Rights. Id.
This argument has no force if one looks to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. It "incor-
porates" the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applicable to citizens only, while the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause redundantly applies to citizens, but also extends due
process protection to aliens. See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (Fifth Amendment due process includes the procedures of Amend-
ments IV through VIII).
150. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
151. Frankfurter noted that Palko was announced by Justice Cardozo speaking for Chief
Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Stone, Roberts and Black. Only
Justice Butler dissented. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59. Frankfurter also praised Judge Moody's opin-
ion in Twining as showing "judicial process at its best", claiming the opinion to be "one of the
outstanding opinions in the history of the Court." Id. Similarly, in depreciating the significance
of the variation between Adamson and Twining, Justice Frankfurter took the unusual step of
invoking the name of the author of the opinion below, "Mr. Justice Traynor." Id. at 60.
Later, Frankfurter invoked the names of Miller, Davis, Bradley, Waite, Matthews, Gray,
Fuller, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo as judges "who were alert in safeguarding and
promoting the interests of liberty and human dignity through law" and who had not held that the
Due Process Clause applied the Bill of Rights to the states. Id. at 62. Again, this is technically
correct with respect to Bradley only by eliminating his early views under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
152. Id. at 60-61. Frankfurter's disdain for the right against self-incrimination was shared by
Charles Fairman and Justice Miller. In his biography of Miller, Fairman related an incident in
which Miller "charged the jury so furiously that a conviction seemed almost certain." The de-
fense counsel requested that Miller instruct that the defendant was not obliged to take the stand,
to which Miller's countenance indicated that he was "annoyed." He proceeded to give the charge
but at the end "added in a distinctly audible stage whisper-it is a mighty strange rule of law,
isn't it?" FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 419.
153. James Simon summarized Frankfurter's 1946 views as believing that Black was "the
epitomical demonic judge, sly, sinister, and bent on wholesale destruction of the law." SIMON,
supra note 131, at 171.
154. In 1957, Frankfurter wrote to Learned Hand that Douglas, Black, and Earl Warren were
all "undisciplined by adequate professional learning and cultivated understanding." G. EDWARD
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The dispute between Frankfurter and Black on this issue had
been simmering since at least i943.155 When trying to influence
Black's view, Frankfurter had indicated that his own conclusions were
based on over twenty years of study.'5 6 By 1952 Frankfurter would
claim to have read "all" of the debates concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment. 57 Yet he was obviously unable to counter Black's legis-
lative history on its own terms, and had to resort to arguing that it was
not relevant.
One indication of that frustration can be seen in Justice Frank-
furter's treatment of Louis Oberdorfer, one of Justice Black's law
clerks and now a United States District Court Judge. Oberdorfer was
instructed by Black to hand-deliver the Adamson dissent. Frankfurter
"bid" Oberdorfer, a Yale Law School graduate, to stay in his cham-
bers while he read the dissent. When he finished, Frankfurter threw
the dissent across the desk to Oberdorfer, scattering the pages on the
floor and dismissing Oberdorfer with the words, "At Yale they call
this scholarship?' 5
8
WtrrE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 181 (1982) (quoting a letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Learned Hand (June 30, 1957)).
One of the reasons Frankfurter valued Chief Justice Fuller was because he was "an ex-
tremely cultivated man, which is important." Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39
VA. L. REV. 883, 887 (1953).
See also Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 13, 1952) (on file with
Harvard Law School) (indicating that Fairman had once thought that blame for the Adamson
dissent "should be allocated in proportion as academic and professional training afforded the
basis for discriminating judgment.").
155. See supra note 131.
156. SIMON, supra note 131, at 175.
157. According to Justice Douglas' Conference notes, in 1952, Frankfurter claimed that he
had personally read "all" of the history on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tushnet, supra note
127, at 755 (citing William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes on Segregation Cases (Dec. 13, 1954)
(William Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1149, Case File: Original Conference Notes
of Segregation Cases)).
Roger Newman has suggested that Frankfurter dealt only with secondary sources and that
Frankfurter never worked directly with the congressional debates. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO
BLACK 355 (1994). There is no evidence of a detailed familiarity with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment debates in any of Frankfurter's incorporation opinions. Frankfurter's Memorandum on
'Incorporation' of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965), is interesting because its author was an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court. But, compared to the Fairman and Crosskey efforts, it has little intrinsic schol-
arly value. In his court opinions, Frankfurter relied upon Fairman rather than original sources.
158. Telephone interview with Judge Louis Oberdorfer (Jan. 1995); NEWMAN, supra note
157, at 354. Nine years later, Frankfurter wrote Learned Hand that one of Black's goals, like
that of Douglas and Earl Warren, was to "have the avant-garde of the Yale Law School...
praise [him]." Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0.
Douglas, and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court,
1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 105.
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Frankfurter's narrow five-four victory in Adamson was the last
"major" victory he won on the Court.159
VIII. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DECISIONS
While Frankfurter was working on his opinion in Adamson, Fair-
man was no doubt busy with his American Constitutional Law Deci-
sions,160 first published in 1948. Part of Fairman's goal was to bring
legal history to the student, which he did by including pictures and a
table showing judicial succession. 161 Fairman wanted people to realize
that the "authoritative" constitutional principles "bear the mark" of
the Justices and with the text he attempted "to identify Justices whose
influence has been outstanding in the history of the Court."'
1 62
There were striking evidences of the Thayer/Frankfurter philoso-
phy. 163 Fairman also referred to Justice Bradley as "one of the great-
est" Supreme Court Justices. 164 This was done in the introductory
notes to Wickard v. Filburn,165 quoting from Bradley's account of his
days as a boy on the farm to give students insight into what farm life
was like in the 1940s. This was done even though Fairman did not
expose the reader to any principal case in which Bradley authored an
opinion. 166
159. Urofsky, supra note 158, at 105.
160. CHARLEs FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DECISIONS (1948). The preface
is dated April 16, 1948.
161. Id. at iiL
162. Id.
163. For example, in the notes which follow Colegove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), Fairman
asked what, for him, appeared to be rhetorical questions:
Would American democracy be strengthened if equality in representation were secured
to the voters by judicial action, regardless of their own lethargy? Would the Court do
well to correct an old evil over which the legislative branch has always had full power
but which it has consistently failed to remedy?
FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 56.
The answer to the modem reader is likely to be that most malproportioned legislatures
would not reapportion themselves to reduce the power of the constituents who elected them.
But there is an air of Thayerian triumph in the note, entitled "The sequel," which followed
Fairman questions:
By an Act of June 26, 1947-scarcely more than a year after the decision of Colegrove
v. Green-the Illinois Legislature repealed the Act of 1901 and made a new and fairer
apportionment [citation omitted]. Evidently the normal forces of democratic govern-
ment had not become inoperative in Illinois.
Id.
Similarly, through a contrast between the views of Justice Sutherland and Justice Brandeis
on "experimentation," Fairman made the case for deference to experimentation in social and
economic matters. I. at 321.
164. Id. at 237.
165. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
166. Fairman did quote Bradley from Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 417-18 (1879).
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The first case in the chapter entitled Constitutional Limitations,
was the Slaughter-House Cases.167 The Slaughter-House Cases168 was
given a prominence by Fairman not shared by any other case in Amer-
ican Constitutional Law Decisions. "A full comprehension of this case
yields the key to perhaps a good third of the entire constitutional law
of the United States."' 69
Viewing Slaughter-House through the lens of the Lochner era,
Fairman identified Miller and the majority with the "liberals" of the
Court during the Chief Justiceships of Taft and Hughes, finding it "es-
sentially true that Miller anticipated" Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and
Cardozo. 170 Miller was introduced as "the strongest man" on the
Court and as a man whose personal letters indicated that "passion"
governed the President and the Congress and that Miller feared this
would result in "the eventual destruction of some of the best princi-
ples of our existing Constitution.'
7'
Fairman's editorial note discussed Barron v. Baltimore.172 Even
though Fairman himself recognized the significance of the split in the
Court over Adamson,173 and was working on his article on incorpora-
tion as he worked on American Constitutional Law Decisions, 74 no
connection was made between the Slaughter-House Cases and those
issues. At the same time Fairman protected the image of Justice Brad-
ley and reduced the focus on the enforcement of the Bill of Rights by
omitting the separate dissenting opinion of Justice Bradley cited by
Justice Black in Adamson.
75
167. FAiMmAN, supra note 160, at 286.
168. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
169. FAi1mMA, supra note 160, at 286.
170. Id.
Though doubtlessly known by Fairman, there is no acknowledgement that Miller's majority
depended upon having the votes of the relatively unknown William Strong and Ward Hunt, the
conservative, David Davis, and the arch conservative, Democrat Nathan Clifford. For sketches
of each see Tsa OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs (Kermit
Hall et al. eds., 1992) and THE JusTicEs OF TI-m SuPREME COURT (Leon Friedman & Fred Isreal
eds., 1986). For the conservatism of Clifford see his grandson's biography, PHILIP G. CLIFFORD,
NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT (1922).
Whatever Miller's deserved level of esteem, it is hardly likely that anyone would mistake
the work of Strong, Hunt, Davis, or Clifford for that of Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, or Cardozo.
171. FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 288-89 (quoting letters of Miller from Fairman's biography
of Miller).
172. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
173. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
174. Fairman indicated that he began working on the article in the summer of 1947 and "the
research and writing was done in 1949." Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan.
17, 1950) (on file with Harvard Law School).
175. FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 301.
Fairman did note the Privileges and Immunities Clause in his Comment following the case,
but did not draw any relationship between the clause and the Bill of Rights or the incorporation
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Writing in 1949, Fairman suggested that instead of trying to cover
all possible areas of constitutional law, an editor should focus upon
"those sectors where controversies are nowadays most likely to be
centered."'1 76 Yet, instead of focusing upon the then current issue, in-
corporation, Fairman focused upon the issues of his younger days,
substantive due process.
Fairman counterbalanced Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House
177
with that of Field. 78 Fairman likened Field to the "conservatives" on
the Court during the tenure of Taft and Hughes, and indicated that
Field "laid the ground for Sutherland and Butler and those who stood
with them."'1 79 Thus, in Fairman's presentation, the Slaughter-House
Cases became a contest over the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment would become "a charter for the freedom of economic
enterprise from public control."'8
In the comment following the case, Fairman utilized the title,
"Justice Field wins the campaign."'' In this note Fairman indicated
that "[b]it by bit" the Court moved to Field's view until his ultimate
triumph in Lochner v. New York. l 82 Indeed, the principal cases which
follow Slaughter-House are Lochner 83 and West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish.ls4
Not until several pages later did Fairman consider the application
of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause in connection
doctrine. Instead, he quoted a portion of Justice Stone's dissent in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 443 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting), describing the clause as the "almost forgotten" provision
and Justice Jackson's statement in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941), indicating
that the Court had "always hesitated to give any real meaning to the privileges and immunities
clause lest it improvidently give too much."
176. Fairman, supra note 22, at 619.
177. FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 291-99.
178. Id. at 299-301.
179. 1& at 286. This, of course, ignored the fact that Field was joined by Chief Justice Chase,
Justice Bradley, and Justice Swayne. While Bradley may have been viewed as moderately con-
servative in his time, no one would have accused Chase or Swayne of such views in Slaughter-
House. See generally THE JusTicEs OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 170; Tm OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 170.
180. FAiRmAN, supra note 160, at 290. Indeed, in the monologue Fairman imagined for Field
and Miller in his comments which follow the case, Fairman attributed to Field a concern for
"inalienable rights" and "the laws of Nature." Id. at 301. In contrast, Miller was thought to be
concerned with the strain upon the government imposed by the political feelings of the times and
the Thayerian concept that if the Court acted as a "perpetual censor," "it would undermine...
the responsibility of the people of the state for securing their well-being through their own polit-
ical and constitutional processes." Id. at 302-03.
181. Id. at 304.
182. Id. (citing 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
183. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
184. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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with the First Amendment and Near v. Minnesota.185 Even here Fair-
man suggested that a "mere logical analysis" of Barron v. Baltimore86
precluded the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, and yet
suggested that under the "liberty" provision of the Due Process
Clause, and a "larger and more philosophical view," the protection of
free speech may be justified. 87
Shortly after its publication Fairman sent this work to Justice
Frankfurter. Frankfurter, having waited to reply until he had read the
book, praised Fairman for having accomplished his goal "with distinc-
tion."'188 "Your introduction and comment on the cases you have cho-
sen make your compact book the best [one volume] collection of
constitutional cases . "..."189
Frankfurter also had personal reasons to be pleased with the book. In
addition to praising Bradley, Miller, and the Slaughter-House Cases,
Fairman frequently quoted Felix Frankfurter. 90
185. 283 U.S. 697 (1931); FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 366-70.
186. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)
187. FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 369-70.
188. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Dec. 8, 1948) (on file with Library of
Congress).
189. Id. Even in praising Fairman's accomplishment, Frankfurter, while admitting that Fair-
man's goals were different than those of Thayer, insensitively diminished his praise by his refer-
ence to Thayer. "Mr. Thayer's two volumes remain a thesaurus with the student of
constitutional law and make all other casebooks, that pretend to be as comprehensive as
Thayer's was for his time, pretty meager by comparison." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Charles Fairman (Dec. 8, 1948) (on ffile with Library of Congress).
The following year, in a review of another constitutional law casebook, Fairman made what
almost seems to be a reply to Frankfurter's praise of Thayer. Fairman also praised Thayer. But,
he suggested that even 'Mayer did not cover the 2420 pages of his own casebook and that in
1949, when Fairman published his book, so much space could not be devoted, because editors
had to make "hard choices." Thus, constitutional law casebooks could be selective in trying to
teach "the method of constitutional adjudication" by selecting cases from "those sectors where
the controversies are nowadays most likely to be centered" or which "present a panorama of the
entire range of existing constitutional law," resulting in "severely trimmed" cases. Though the
book under review chose the latter, it seems clear that Fairman sought to choose the former in
his own 1948 work. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 618-19.
190. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), was used as a principle case in FAIRMAN, supra
note 160, at 49. A paragraph of Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Freeman v. Hewitt, 329
U.S. 249 (1946), was quoted in the notes introducing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). Fairman, supra note 160, at 221. Fairman included Frankfurter's concurring opinions in
Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 158-60,
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 395-96, and his dissent-
ing opinion in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), FAuMAN, supra
note 160, at 410-12.
See also Justice Burton's dissenting opinion with which Justice Frankfurter concurred in
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 282-83, and a quota-
tion in the introductory notes, id. at 388, from Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). In discussing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), Fairman
quoted Felix Frankfurter, ""Me Supreme Court," in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
476 (1934). FAIRMAN, supra note 160, at 34.
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In that same letter, Frankfurter asked what was to become a re-
curring question: "What progress are you making on your Brad-
ley?"'' Fairman assured Frankfurter he was "pursuing Justice
Bradley as persistently as possible in a busy post-war academic
life."1 92
IX. THE JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY ROUNDTABLE
Fairman could not have devoted all of his time to Bradley in 1948.
In addition to completing his casebook and collecting materials on
Adamson, Fairman organized the Round Table on Judicial Biography
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
held in Chicago in December. 193 Papers were presented by a number
of scholars in legal history, including people who had published or
were writing judicial biographies. 194 Included in the published pro-
ceedings was a letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman with
thoughts on the importance of the task of writing judicial
biographies.
9 5
As one would expect, Fairman's introduction of the Frankfurter
letter was filled with praise. In thinking about the roundtable, Fair-
man's thoughts "naturally" turned to Justice Frankfurter who had set
an example, "by exemplifying the most refined and discriminating
standards in the study of judicial action, by stressing at the same time
the enlarged view that puts each instance in its perspective, [and] by
fostering the traditions of our highest Court.'
96
Frankfurter's letter is most interesting for purposes of this article
because of its reference to Fairman's work on Justice Bradley. "Per-
haps you [Fairman] will tell us in your Life of Bradley why that 'cor-
poration lawyer' should have entertained such drastic but wise views
191. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Dec. 8, 1948) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress).
192. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 18, 1947) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
193. The Annual Meeting was held on December 28-30, 1948. Charles Fairman, Introduction:
The Writing of Judicial Biography, 24 IND. L. REV. 363, n.* (1949).
194. John P. Frank, Ingredients of Judicial Biography, 14 IND. L. REV. 374 (1949); Willard
Hurst, Who is the "Great" Appellate. Judge?, 24 IND. L. REV. 394 (1949); Willard L. King, The
Quest for Material, 24 IND. L. REV. 391 (1949); Lynford A. Lardner, Judges As Students of Amer-
ican Society, 24 IND. L. REV. 386 (1949); Arnaud B. Leavelle, Types of Judicial Biography, 24
IND. L. REV. 369 (1949); Carl B. Swisher, The Judge in Historical Perspective, 14 IND. L. REV. 381
(1949).
195. Fairman, supra note 193, at 367-69. Fairman had requested this letter. Letter from
Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 18, 1948) (on file with Harvard Law School).
196. Fairman, supra note 193, at 366.
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of constitutional law."'9 Shortly thereafter, Fairman assured Frank-
furter that he was making progress on Bradley and promised to for-
ward Frankfurter a reprint of his article The Education of a Justice:
Mr. Justice Bradley and Some of his Colleagues.198 Frankfurter replied
that he was "looking forward with eagerness" to the Bradley piece. 199
X. "THE" STANFORD ARTICLE
Fairman's 1949 Stanford article is legendary. The effect of Fair-
man's work is illustrated by the fact that as late as 1985 it was the
nineteenth most cited article in the preceding forty years. 200 While I
have suggested elsewhere that Fairman was incorrect in his under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment,20' the accuracy or inaccuracy
of Professor Fairman's Fourteenth Amendment views is beyond the
scope of this article.
The decision in Adamson was announced on June 23, 1947, a time
when Stanford did not yet have a law review. But plans were under-
way to establish a law review and "[t]he Review planners," who un-
doubtedly included Charles Fairman among their numbers, "read with
more than casual interest the dissent of Mr. Justice Black. ' 202 Because
the disagreement in Adamson "reached to the very heart of constitu-
tional law" and considering the "zeal with which Mr. Justice Black
pursue[d] his beliefs," it was "highly desirable to publish a fully docu-
mented study of the historical origins" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 3
197. I& at 368.
198. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 10, 1949) (on file with Library of
Congress).
199. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Feb. 15, 1949) (on file with Library of
Congress).
200. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1550
(1985).
201. Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57 (1993).
It seems clear, however, that adherence to Thayer's methodology does not necessarily pro-
duce Fairman's results. The copy of volume I of Thayer's case book to which I had access be-
longs to the Case Western Reserve Law School Library. From the marginal handwritten notes
concerning assignments for certain dates made at pp. 623, 673, and 774, it appears that the book
was being used in the fall of 1904.
Following Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which was a just compensation
case (not a due process case), an anonymous student wrote that the Fifth Amendment applied to
the U.S. government and not to the states. Immediately thereafter is the following handwritten
entry: "see amendment XIV making this apply to states." 1 CASES, supra note 21, at 452.
202. President's Page, 2 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1949).
203. Id. at 3.
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Charles Fairman was "invited" to undertake that study.2o4 Conse-
quently, "[lietters went out to libraries and depositories throughout
the country. Microfilm, books, and documents came back. '20 5 Fair-
man began with a sketch of the chronology of important matters fac-
ing the thirty-ninth Congress,206 an exegesis of Article IV, Section 2,
and Justice Bushrod Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.
20 7
The result of the latter was to conclude that one could not look to
Corfield as a reliable guide on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Privileges and Immunities Clause even when it was cited or
quoted in the debates. 208
Next, Fairman devoted fifty-three pages to a summary, with fre-
quent quotations, of the relevant Congressional debates beginning
with the debate over the Civil Rights Bill on January 29, 1866, debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment, and a short critique of Horace
Flack's account of the debates.2°9 This was followed by a considera-
tion of "what the country understood to be the import" of the amend-
ment.210 The next fifty-one pages covered the ratification by the
states.211
204. Id. At the same time, Professor Stanley Morrison of the Stanford faculty was also in-
vited to work on the project which included "the judicial construction of the Amendment." Id.
A "natural" division of the project led to Fairman undertaking the study of the origins of the
amendment and Morrison the judicial history. Id. at 3-4.
Years later, Fairman indicated that Warren Christopher, the President of the Stanford Law
Review, "suggested" that he write the article. NEWMAN, supra note 157, at 681 n.5. Warren
Christopher speculates that the idea to write on Adamson may have originated from Stanley
Morrison, in whose constitutional law class Christopher was enrolled. Telephone Interview with
Warren Christopher (Feb. 13, 1995).
205. Presidents Page, supra note 202, at 4. Fairman began the research in the summer of
1947, but "the actual research and writing were done between June and September '49." Letter
from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 17, 1950) (on file with Harvard Law School).
206. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 5-9 (1949).
207. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823 ) (No. 3,236).
208. Fairman, supra note 206, at 12-15. For a criticism of Fairman's analysis and an entirely
different view, see Richard L. Aynes, Justice Bushrod Washington's Contribution to the Framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment: Corfield v. Coryell (forthcoming).
209. Fairman, supra note 206, at 15-68. In his Adamson dissent, Justice Black cited Horace
Flack, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 n.5, (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), and Fairman
introduced this discussion by reference to "one of Justice Black's footnotes." Fairman, supra
note 206, at 65.
210. Fairman, supra note 206, at 68-81. Again, a reference to Justice Black was made, quot-
ing, in parallel columns, Justice Black's citation of Flack on Senator Howard's speech, what
Flack actually said, and Fairman's analysis criticizing both. Id. at 79-81,
211. Id. at 81. In this section, Fairman drew upon evidence which he argued supported the
view that there were many inconsistencies between the Bill of Rights and state constitutions,
especially with respect to the grand jury, civil jury, and criminal jury requirements of the Bill of
Rights. Five years later, William Crosskey argued that most of these claims of conflicts were
non-existent. Justice Frankfurter ignored Crosskey, relied upon Fairman, and utilized Fairman's
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Ignoring the early decision by Judge (later Justice) Woods and
Justice Bradley indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states,212 and virtu-
ally ignoring the Slaughter-House decision itself, Fairman examined
Twitchell v. Pennsylvania213 and Justices of the Supreme Court of New
York v. United States ex rel. Murray,214 and concluded that the con-
temporary understanding of the Court would not support Justice
Black's view.215
Fairman ultimately concluded that the framers of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause "[e]vidently ... had no clear idea as to the
confines of the clause, and in the main no awareness either of their
own want of understanding. '216 Their thinking was "hazy" and they
never indicated "the basis or measure" of a citizen's privileges or
imiunities.217
After "[b]rooding" over the meaning of the clause while writing
this article, Fairman "slowly" came to the conclusion that, "Justice
Cardozo's gloss on the due process clause-what is 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty'-comes as close as one can to catching the
vague aspirations that were hung upon the privileges and immunities
clause. '21 8 This led Fairman to imply that the Slaughter-House Cases
were properly decided and to chide Justice Black, who had "rebelled"
against selective incorporation, claiming that "the record of history is
overwhelmingly against him. '219
One telling aspect of Fairman's approach was a lack of even-
handedness toward the framers. He frequently, though not inevitably,
offered biographical information to aid the reader in assessing the
weight to be given to the statements of the Congressmen he quoted.
For example, in introducing the members of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, Fairman indicated that Maryland Senator Reverdy
Johnson was a Democrat, that he had argued cases before the United
research to produce a chart showing the claimed conflicts as pan of his opinion in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,140-49 (1959).
212. See supra note 39.
213. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
214. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870).
215. Fairman, supra note 206, at 132-34.
216. Id at 138.
217. Id. at 138-39.
218. Id. at 139. Fairman thought that one of the virtues of this was that it allowed protection
of freedom of speech, which he admitted was part of the 1866 discussion, and yet did not include
any of the "federal requirements as to juries." Id.




States Supreme Court for forty years, and that he made thoughtful
judgments on constitutional questions.220 Similarly, Representative
Henry J. Raymond was identified as an "old line Whig, original Re-
publican, publisher of the New York Times" who was "responsibly
related to the major developments in government and politics." 221
Even with individuals not so prominent, Fairman found it important
to identify the fact that they were lawyers. 222
Yet Fairman is curiously silent about the experience and back-
ground of Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham, who he ac-
knowledged as a "key figure" in his inquiry concerning the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 223 This was so, in spite of the fact that
contemporary sources available to Fairman indicated Bingham's
prominence as a lawyer, a county prosecutor, a judge-advocate of the
Union Army, Solicitor of the United States Court of Claims, Chair-
man of the Managers in the 1862 impeachment of Judge West Hum-
phreys, special judge advocate in the Court Martial of the Surgeon
General of the United States, a special judge advocate in the trial of
the Lincoln murder conspirators and Chairman of the Managers in the
impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson.
224
Beyond this lack of even-handedness, it appears that Fairman
shared Frankfurter's disdain for the jury provisions of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Amendments. "The freedom that the states traditionally
have exercised to develop their own systems for administering justice,
repels any thought the federal provisions on grand jury, criminal jury,
and civil jury were fastened upon them in 1868. ''225
220. Id. at 19. As Crosskey noted, "it is always the critics and opponents of what was being
done who were the able lawyers and men of competence." Crosskey, supra note 9, at 22.
221. Fairman, supra note 206, at 47.
222. E.g., Representative William Higby of California, id. at 27, and Representative John F.
Farnsworth of Illinois, it at 50.
223. Id. at 25.
224. See e.g., 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 277-78 (Allen Johnson ed., 1929);
BEN. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
183-84 (1914); CARRINGTON T. MARSHALL, 3 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF
OIo 860 (1934); 9 Tam NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 375-76 (1907).
These same sources would have told Fairman that Bingham was an active campaigner for
the Whig Party beginning in 1840; that he called national attention to himself when he attempted
to have the Whig Party adopt an antislavery resolution as its platform in its 1848 Convention;
that he was one of early leaders of the Republican Party in Ohio; and that having served in
Congress as a Republican from 1854-1862 and 1865-1872 he was intimately involved in most of
the important national developments leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
225. Fairman, supra note 206, at 137 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Cross-
key himself thought the Seventh Amendment should be repealed. Crosskey, supra note 9, at 115-
16.
Justice Miller apparently shared both Fairman and Frankfurter's lack of respect for at least
the civil jury. Fairman quoted the following statement from Justice Miller's 1879 speech to the
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This article also evidenced a noticeable change in Fairman's writ-
ing style. While bold and clear in his prior articles, there was a per-
ceptible change in his Stanford piece.226 There is substantial truth in
Crosskey's claim that:
[Fairman's] method was to let drop, here and there, throughout his
discussion, derogatory hints and comments which gave the impres-
sion that the framers of the amendment, and Bingham in particular,
were not very bright; that they held the strangest ideas about the
Constitution; knew little about it, or about the decisions of the
Supreme Court under it; ... and that it was not to be expected
anything intelligible could come from their hands.
227
Mark Tushnet has suggested that Frankfurter's judicial philoso-
phy was that if there was no clear legislative intent, then the Justices
were free to make their own decision.228 If this is so, then the critics
who found Fairman's "proof" to be largely negative evidence 229 miss
the point. Under Tushnet's view of Frankfurter's theory, Fairman was
not required to prove anything. It was enough to create doubt or
cause confusion. Indeed, after reviewing the Congressional debates
themselves, one cannot read Fairman's Stanford article without recal-
ling Fairman's own quotation from a letter of Justice Miller:
A skillful lawyer in opening a case will often be able to throw so
much doubt around a clear matter, or give so much importance to
New York Bar Association with seeming approval. "It requires all the veneration which age
inspires in this mode of dispensing justice, and all that eminent men have said of its value in
practice, to prevent our natural reason from revolting against the system, and especially some of
its incidents." Samuel F. Miller, supra note 102, at 205. See also FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra
note 54, at 409-11 (indicating that in civil trials Miller preferred three judge panels to juries and
in criminal proceedings he preferred the French system of preliminary examination of the ac-
cused in Court).
226. There is some hint of this same style in Fairman's volume of the Holmes Devise. In the
reviews of Part I, for example, Fairman was criticized for not making his own views known and
marshaling evidence which supported his views. E.g., Benedict, supra note 90, at 134; Casper,
supra note 85, at 919. This goes beyond general conclusions and summaries. For example, Casper
finds that the "most straightforward summary" of Fairman's assessment of Chase can be gleaned
from the negative implications one draws from Fairman's praise of Waite. Casper, supra note 85,
at 916. Similarly, Benedict relies on what Fairman "implies" about the origins of Radical Recon-
struction and in another instance indicates that with respect to a certain point in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), "Professor Fairman implies, in a somewhat overly coy man-
ner, I think, that the Court majority knew the actual circumstances of those congressional pro-
nouncements and intentionally blurred them." Benedict, supra note 90, at 864, 868.
Thus, it is possible that Fairman's 1949 article reflected an evolution in style from his earlier
work. However, his later writings on Bradley have the same forthright style as his pre-1949
articles. E.g., FIVE JusnTcEs, supra note 34; Charles Fairman, Foreword: The Attack on the Seg-
regation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83 (1956); Fairman, supra note 2.
227. Crosskey, supra note 9, at 11.
228. Tushnet, supra note 127, at 755.
229. E.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 195 n.56 (1980) (Fairman's work simply
concludes that Black's view is "not proven."); LEONARD LEVY, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS XV (1970) ("Fairman's findings were basically negative.").
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an immaterial one, that his unwary opponent follows him into the
web of sophistry, when he could have stood secure on ground of his
own selection.230
Stanford published a companion piece by Stanley Morrison enti-
tled, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Judicial Interpretation, simultaneously with Fairman's 1949 arti-
cle.231 Though articulated as a piece concerning precedent, Morrison
relied heavily upon Fairman's legislative history. An interesting point
appeared at page 162 where Morrison condescendingly indicated that
Justice Black's history was incorrect.2 32 Morrison provided what one
might, on a first reading, regard as Morrison's view of the source of
what he saw as Justice Black's errors. "Perhaps it is not surprising
that in [Black's] historical study he did not get an accurate picture.
Obviously a Justice of the Supreme Court, even with the aid of a capa-
ble secretary, does not have the time for exhaustive historical research
"233
But, without acknowledging any inconsistency, Morrison pro-
ceeded with a harsher critique of what he viewed as Black's errors.
After accusing Justice Black of relying on statements taken out of con-
text, Morrison lamented that, "four of the judges are willing to distort
history, as well as the language of the framers, in order to read into
the Constitution provisions which they think ought to be there. It is
particularly regrettable that the great talents of Mr. Justice Black
should be so misdirected. ' 234
Yet, if Black was reading his own views into the Constitution,
then inadequate historical research was not the real problem. One
possibility is that what seems like a criticism of Justice Black's histori-
cal research was really an apology for Justice Frankfurter's failure to
respond with any critique of Justice Black's history.
Frankfurter sent Fairman an apparently complimentary letter on
the Fourteenth Amendment articles, which Fairman "promptly
230. Samuel F. Miller, supra note 102, at 204 (quoting letter from Justice Miller, in DANIEL F.
MILLER, RHETORIC AS AN ART OF PERSUASION. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A LAWYER 38-40
(1880)).
231. Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). Morrison was a 1919 graduate of Harvard
Law School and served as Justice Holmes' law clerk in 1919 and 1920. 4 WHO'S WHO IN
AMERICA, 1961-1968, 681 (1968).
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showed" to Stanley Morrison.235 Fairman's reply suggested that he
was acting on his own initiative. He indicated that he had not sent
Justice Frankfurter a copy of the volume, but that he knew Frank-
furter was "a reader of [the] Stanford Law Review, & I hoped [he]
would approve. '236
Fairman wrote Frankfurter that he had been reading as-of-yet un-
published works by Howard J. Graham and Jacobus tenBroek.237
Fairman related that much of the material consisted of accounts of
anti-slavery propaganda and pamphlets which might shed light on the
popular understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.238 Though
Fairman did not find any direct relationship between these discussions
and the debates in Congress or in most of the state legislatures, he did
indicate that it helped him gain "a better appreciation" of the
thoughts of the majority of the committee considering the amendment
in the Massachusetts legislature.239
Writing to Fairman on January 27, 1950, Frankfurter expressed
skepticism about Graham and tenBroek's methodology. "[T]his busi-
ness of trying to find the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in this
or that pamphlet or this or that individual expression of hope of what
was accomplished by the Amendment... is not way of dealing with 'a
constituent act' like the Fourteenth Amendment. ''240
Frankfurter "long ago" determined that the "fact" that the Bill of
Rights would have required "half the states to uproot their whole sys-
tem of criminal justice or require every $20.00 case to be tried before
a jury" was "decisive." 241
235. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 17, 1950) (on file with Harvard
Law School). The letter from Frankfurter to Fairman is not included in either of the Collections
of Frankfurter's papers.
236. Id.
237. Id. It is possible that Fairman was reading a draft of tenBroek's book THE ANTnSLAV-
aRY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951), which was republished in 1965 in an
enlarged edition under the title EQUAL UNDER LAW.
238. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 17, 1950) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
239. Id. (referencing Fairman, supra note 206, at 118-21).
240. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
241. Id. Frankfurter's position, however, ignores the political realities of the amendment
process. Each of the four major sections of the Fourteenth Amendment involves a separate and
distinct subject matter. Had the framers of the Amendment followed the example of James
Madison and the First Congress in submitting proposals for the Bill of Rights to the states, they
would have submitted four separate amendments and allowed the states to pick and choose
which of the four "amendments" they wanted to accept and which they wanted to reject. In-
deed, with the original Bill of Rights, twelve amendments were originally presented, ten of which
were initially accepted and two of which were initially rejected.
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Frankfurter's March 10, 1950 letter again commended Fairman
for his Fourteenth Amendment article. "Your study of the Fourteenth
Amendment deserves the engaging format given to it in the reprint
from the Stanford Law Review. I am grateful to have it as a
separate." 242
As one might expect, Justice Black had a much different reaction.
He was greatly disappointed in the article and questioned Fairman's
detachment. "I now think of Mr. Fairman as an advocate, not a histo-
rian, and I would not rank him at the top of advocates of the
world." 243
XI. JUSTICE BRADLEY AGAIN
Fairman did not abandon Justice Bradley while working on his
Stanford article. In apparent response to Fairman's indication that he
was going to examine Bradley's role in the 1877 Electoral Commis-
sion, Frankfurter indicated that his "interest in that has been stirred
by Allan Nevins's contemptuous attitude toward Bradley."'2 "4 Frank-
furter's response to that view was not only one of interest but certi-
Instead, the framers chose to link the entire package together in an "omnibus" provision
which required voters to accept or reject the entire package. Frankfurter's theory assumes that if
the legislators in each state were given a choice between resolving monumental problems facing
the country (citizenship, the enforcement of the rights of citizens, the enforcement of the rights
of persons, the basis on which voters were to be apportioned, the ability of those in rebellion to
participate in government, and the security of the Union debt) and rejecting of traditional civil
rights protections (grand jury, petit jury, and civil jury trial), that they would have rejected the
Amendment in order to preserve their right not to have jury protections. This conclusion is not
self-evident.
242. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Mar. 10, 1950) (on file with Library
of Congress). At the same time, Fairman sent Frankfurter a reprint of his Some New Problems
of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1949). Frankfurter indicated that he
was glad to have a reprint, but he had already read it "last year." This, together with his refer-
ence to being "grateful" to have the Fourteenth Amendment article "as a separate," suggests
that Frankfurter had read that article before as well.
243. Newman, supra note 157, at 356 (quoting letter from Justice Black to John P. Frank
(Feb. 28, 1950)).
244. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Mar. 10, 1950) (on file with Library
of Congress). This was a reference to ALLAN NEVINS, ABRAM S. HEwrr-r (1935).
Abraham S. Hewitt made a fortune in iron, steel, and railroad development. With the ex-
ception of one term, Hewitt served in Congress from 1874-1886. He served as Chairman of the
Democratic National Committee and directed Tilden's presidential campaign in 1876. TmE Co-
LUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (William Bridgwater & Seymour Kurtz eds., 3d ed. 1963).
As such, Hewitt was intimately involved in the negotiations over the electoral commission
which ultimately lead to Hayes's election. While Nevins gave a favorable account of the assess-
ment of Bradley's integrity prior to the decision of the Electoral Commission, Nevins ultimately
concluded that on the night before the decision of the Commission, around midnight, Justice
Bradley indicated to his "intimate friend," John G. Stevens, that he would cast a vote which
would result in the election of Tilden. Nevins claimed that Bradley showed his written opinion
to Stevens. Nevins concluded that a post-midnight visit from Bradley's long-time friend, Repub-
lican Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and George M. Robeson "in all probability" convinced
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tude: "Of course [Nevins] isn't entitled to value the juristic quality of
Bradley."245
What also disturbed Frankfurter was that Nevins had, according
to Frankfurter, attempted to "persuade [Willard] King to play down
Bradley in his Life of Fuller.''246 Frankfurter reported that King re-
fused to do this because he "realized" that on the subject of Bradley,
Nevins was not "one speaking with authority." 247
In the June 1950 correspondence, Frankfurter discussed Fair-
man's discovery that Bradley had written substantial parts of Waite's
opinion in Munn v. Illinois and expressed his "eagerness" in "looking
forward" to Fairman's book on Bradley.
248
Fairman sent Frankfurter his revised, second edition of
American Constitutional Law Decisions,249  which Frankfurter
Bradley to change his vote on grounds other than the merits, though he also indicated "the full
truth will never be known." NEVINS, supra, at 368-73.
Fairman's supplement to his Holmes Devise Volumes, FIVE JUSTICES, supra note 34, at xiv,
sought to vindicate Bradley's decision (Foreword by Paul A. Freund). But there is no consensus
on Bradley's role. E.g., John V. Orth, Joseph P. Bradley, in THE OxFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF Tm UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) ("Although appar-
ently pulled in both directions, [Bradley] closed ranks with his fellow Republicans and declared
Rutherford B. Hayes president-elect.").




Frankfurter was referring to WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER, CHIEF JUS-
TICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1888-1910 (1950). The Library of Congress has 5 folders of corre-
spondence between Frankfurter and King between 1947 and 1956.
King did nothing to hurt the reputation of Bradley. Indeed, he referred to Bradley as the
"Justice Holmes of that Court." Id. at 129. On the matter of Bradley's appointment, King indi-
cated that it was rumored that Bradley had "been put on the Court by President Grant to re-
verse the first legal-tender decision, but this charge was unjust to Bradley in light of the evidence
since produced." Id. at 130.
Though King's bibliography listed Nevins' THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA (1927),
GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN COURAGE (1932) and LETTERS OF GROVER CLEVELAND
(1933), it did not include ABRAM S. HEwrr. Id. at 346. His bibliography also included Fair-
man's biography of Justice Miller and two works by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 344. Further, while
King's acknowledgements included W. W. Crosskey and Nevins, it also included Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Charles Fairman, Mark De Wolfe Howe, and Carl Brent Swisher. Id. at ix.
248. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (June 8, 1950) (on file with Harvard
Law School); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (June 24, 1950) (on file with
Harvard Law School).
249. Fairman reissued this book in 1950 adding Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and
seven pages of notes concerning other cases relating to racial discrimination. See CHARLES FAIR-
MAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DECISIONS 460-470 (2d ed. 1950). Among the cases dis-
cussed in the notes were Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927);
Corrigan v. Bucklehy, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); and a variety of lower court cases.
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praised.250 The question of Bradley persisted: "Am I right in assum-
ing that you will let no major undertaking deflect you from completing
the Bradley?" '2
5'
Fairman assured Frankfurter that he was proceeding as deliber-
ately as was reasonable. He wanted Bradley's biography to be even
better than Miller's. 252 One of the difficulties was that to deal with the
"Affairs of '76-'77" and "to meet the allegations & insinuations left by
Allan Nevins" was a task for Scotland Yard.
25 3
Frankfurter was still concerned with Nevins in October of 1950
when Frankfurter was reading Nevins's Emergence of Lincoln.
254
While conceding that Nevins's "bulky volumes" had "worth," Frank-
furter nevertheless complained that "the praise that is bestowed upon
them is, from my point of view, plain silly.
'255
In that same letter Frankfurter praised the newly established
Stanford Law Review. "Distinction is not something that can be es-
tablished overnight, but the Stanford Law Review seems to have ac-
complished that feat. '256 As of that date, the journal had only
published two volumes consisting of six issues. One of the issues in-
cluded Fairman's 1949 article on the Fourteenth Amendment 257 and
Stanley Morrison's less enduring Does the Fourteenth Amendment In-
Fairman also quoted an amicus brief by A Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation
in Legal Education calling for Plessy v. Ferguson to be overruled. FAIRMAN, supra, at 462. This
was the first time that the issue of "civil rights" appears to have played any important role in
Fairman's writings. The Amicus Brief, filed on January 20, 1950, contains the names of 178 law
Professors, including Charles E. Corker and Carl Spaeth of Stanford and eight members of the
faculty at Harvard. Fairman's name was not on the brief.
Though some other editorial changes were made to account for new developments in for-
eign affairs and criminal procedure, see idU at 376-383, there is no reference to Adamson. Id at
vii (Table of Cases Cited). The portions concerning Justice Bradley, Justice Miller, and the
Slaughter-House Cases remained the same.
250. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Oct. 9, 1950) (on file with Harvard
Law School). This time there was no reference to 'Mayer.
251. Id.
252. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 21, 1950) (on file with Library of
Congress).
253. Id. In his FrVE JusTcEs, supra note 34, Fairman treated the analysis of Nevins and
others. He titled part four of his book "Nevins' Hewitt and the 'Secret History."' Id. at 159. In
his preface, Fairman raised "[n]o question" of the "high quality" of Nevins' book "until it comes
to Hewitt's account of the election of 1876 and the Electoral Commission." Id. at xviii.
254. ALLAN NEViNS, THE EMERGENCE OF LINcoLN (1950).
255. Id.
256. i
257. Fairman, supra note 206.
[Vol. 70:1197
1995] FAIRMAN, FRANKFURTER, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1239
corporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation.258 Fairman
also contributed two articles and a book review to the other issue.
259
In that same mailing Fairman sent Frankfurter the results of a
series of lectures he presented at Boston entitled What Makes a Great
Justice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892.260
Frankfurter termed the work "admirable" and indicated that this early
work made him "impatient for the final volume."'261
In many ways those lectures presented an overview of Bradley's
career. Fairman set forth a goal of tracing the "main lines" of consti-
tutional litigation, cases involving the Commerce Clause, due process,
and equal protection.262 Fairman suggested that while the Court de-
cided specific cases, they were really "at work on the all-embracing
question, What sort of country is America to be-what shall be the
characteristics of its economy, what shall be the qualities of the peo-
ple's liberty, where within this federal system shall various responsibil-
ities be exercised?" Rather than suggesting that the Constitution in
some manner restrained the Justices, Fairman declared that "[o]n
these, the ultimate problems, the Constitution speaks with Delphic
reticence; it is actually the Justices that pronounce the responses. '263
In his discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fairman re-
ferred to the Adamson dispute and his own Stanford article 264 where
he found that "the members of Congress really had no clearly under-
258. Morrison, supra note 231.
259. In Volume 1, Fairman was the author of two articles totaling 105 pages and a book
review. Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice: Justice Bradley and Some of His Col-
leagues, 1 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1949); Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution
Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1949); Charles Fairman, Book Review, 1 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1949) (reviewing Pmtip C. Jassup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948)).
In Volume 2, Fairman's Fourteenth Amendment article accounted for 135 pages and Stanley
Morrison's Fourteenth Amendment article added another 33 pages. Fairman, supra note 206, at
5-139; Morrison, supra note 231, at 140-73.
In addition, volume 1 contained a review of John P. Frank's biography of Justice Black.
Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., Book Review, 1 STAN. L. REV. 578-81 (1949) (reviewing JOHN P.
FRANK, MR. JUsTICE BLACK 1949)). Thurman was highly critical of Justice Black, indicating that
"many intelligent observers of the Supreme Court fail to find in [Black] ... the sine qua non for
judicial greatness-objectivity." Id. at 579. In the areas of patents and monopolies, Black had
"the zeal of the legislator or the prosecutor rather than the detachment of the judge." Id. at 580.
One "gap" in the book is the failure to "analyze the extent to which [Black's] personal views
have properly or improperly entered into the decision of Supreme Court cases . I... d. at 581.
260. Fairman, supra note 2. See letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Mar. 10,
1950) (on file with Library of Congress).
261. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Mar. 10, 1950) (on file with Library
of Congress).
262. Fairman, supra note 2, at 69.
263. Id. at 68.
264. Fairman, supra note 206.
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stood purpose. '265 Fairman suggested, perhaps for the first time in his
writings, that "Congress, no doubt, meant ... to establish some sub-
stantial rights even though the State might not itself have established
them for its own citizens. These were the 'privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."' 266 But because Congress did not make
"clear what their content should be, [i]t left that to the Justices when
actual cases required answers.
'267
In explaining how the Court provided those answers, within the
context of reviewing the Slaughter-House Cases, Fairman concluded
that the Court "virtually scratched [the privileges and immunities
clause] from the Constitution. '268 The Court's decision-making
process, in the words of Fairman, involved choice. "The words meant
too much, or almost nothing. The majority chose the latter
alternative. '
269
In discussing the Civil Rights Cases,270 Fairman implicitly, but
gently, criticized Bradley by suggesting that Harlan's dissent had
"points of real strength," suggesting that the Supreme Court was mov-
ing toward the abolition of the "color line," and calling for civil rights
legislation which would "avoid the pitfalls" of the 1870s and 1880s.
271
XII. THE EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD ARTICLE
On January 2, 1952, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
conviction in Rochin v. California.272 Justice Frankfurter wrote the
majority opinion, holding that it violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment for the state to forcibly administer an
emetic and then to use the contents from the accused's stomach to
convict him of possession of morphine.273 Justice Black concurred in
265. Fairman, supra note 2, at 77 (footnote omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id. Though not cited by Fairman, the Court indicated that it would interpret art. IV, § 2
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause by using this case-by-case approach. Conner v. Elliott,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855).
268. Fairman, supra note 2, at 78.
269. Id. Compare the words of Justice Robert Jackson in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 183 (1941) (the Court "always hesitated to give any real meaning to the privileges and
immunities clause lest it improvidently give too much.").
270. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
271. Fairman, supra note 2, at 82-83. Two years later Fairman suggested that the "current of
decisions in the Court is steadily against all discrimination based on race or color." Charles
Fairman, Editorial Comment, Finis to Fujii, 46 AM. J. INT'L LAW 682, 686 (1952).
272. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The issue in Rochin was whether it violated the accused's rights to
force an emetic solution through a tube into the accused's stomach against his will, thereby
inducing vomiting, and then to use the contents of the vomit to convict the accused of the posses-
sion of morphine. Id. at 166.
273. Id. at 173.
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judgment, finding that this action violated the accused's Fifth Amend-
ment rights and relying upon his dissent in Adamson to enforce those
provisions against the state.274 Black accused the majority of adopting
"evanescent standards" which, in the past, had "been used to nullify
state legislative programs passed to suppress evil economic
practices. '2
75
Frankfurter sent a copy of the slip opinion to Fairman.276 Fair-
man, apparently viewing his Stanford article as conclusive, was sur-
prised "[t]hat the historical part of the Adamson dissent should now
be reaffirmed. '277 Indeed, Fairman had expected Black's dissent to
"sink without trace. ' 278 Fairman had previously been willing to attri-
bute Black's dissent to "ardor," "want of scholarly discipline," and
"uncritical haste in jumping to a desired conclusion. '279 Indeed, Fair-
man thought that the blame for the dissent "should be allocated in
proportion as academic and professional training afforded the basis
for discriminating judgment. ''28
°
Obviously wanting to respond to Black's new opinion, Fairman
was taken aback when a member of the Vanderbilt symposium re-
ferred to Fairman's Stanford article as a "brief."'281 Apparently sensi-
tized by this conversation, Fairman told Frankfurter that "anything
more now from me would do more harm than good-would look like
the expression of some personal feeling. '28
2
Frankfurter agreed that Fairman ought not to make a further at-
tempt to write on the this question, referring to his "historic and not
274. Id. at 174-75.
275. Id. at 177. Justice Douglas also filed a concurring opinion. His opinion indicated that
these types of practices had been upheld by a majority of the courts which had considered them
and these judges were "as sensitive as we are to the proper standards for law administration." Id.
at 178. This demonstrated, in Douglas's view, that this practice could not violate the "decencies
of civilized conduct" as Frankfurter suggested. Id.
Instead, Douglas concurred on due process grounds, suggesting that because the right
against self-incrimination was required in federal trials it should be required in state trials as
well. Id. at 179.





280. Id. Though Fairman's letter does not make his intent clear, in the context of the times
this might be read to suggest that Justice Douglas, who was thought to be well-educated and
have more significant professional experience, should be held to a higher standard than Justice




merely historical" article in Stanford.28 3 Frankfurter heard "the good
news", which turned out to be untrue, that Fairman had completed
"the Bradley. '284 He repeated what Fairman well knew: "For the ap-
pearance of few books have I been eagerly anticipating, as I have your
Bradley."' 285 But Fairman's reply indicated that Bradley was "still far
from complete. ' '2 6
In the meantime, Fairman's Stanford article was making an im-
pression upon other Supreme Court Justices. Ironically, the Supreme
Court first used Fairman's Fourteenth Amendment findings in Justice
Jackson's dissent from Frankfurter's opinion in Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois. 287 Jackson, another Supreme Court friend of Fairman's, argued
for deference to state libel laws in the face of First Amendment at-
tack.288 In doing so, he relied upon both the Fairman and the Morri-
son articles, terming them "the most comprehensive and objective
studies of the origin and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 9
In 1952, Charles Fairman left Stanford to become the Charles
Nagel Professor of Law at Washington University of St. Louis. Frank-
furter congratulated Fairman on the "transfer" and indicated that this
would "mean the early completion of your Bradley makes me very
happy."29°
Fairman returned to Bradley in his July 1953 publication, The So-
called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley.291 Munn v. Illi-
nois292 was an important case for those dedicated to the New Deal. It
provided an account of an earlier era, prior to the "fall" from grace
into Lochner, when the Court deferred to state legislative judgments
and allowed the states to regulate economic interests with little or no




286. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 19, 1952) (on file with Harvard
Law School). In that same letter Fairman indicated that in order to complete the Bradley biogra-
phy, "[aIll I need is time - lots of it." Id.
287. 343 U.S. 250, 294 (1952).
288. Id. at 295.
289. Id. at 294.
290. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Apr. 15, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress). Frankfurter assumed that Fairman's position at St. Louis would allow him more
time to work on his book. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (May 18, 1953) (on
file with Harvard Law School).
291. Granger Cases, supra note 34.
292. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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oversight.293 Chief Judge Waite, who authored Munn, was singled out
for praise by people like Felix Frankfurter.294
The burden of Fairman's article was not only to establish the con-
text of the Munn decision and to analyze it in such a way as to support
its result, but also to demonstrate that critical portions of Waite's
opinion were taken from a memorandum written by Justice Brad-
ley.295 This added to the attractiveness of Bradley for Fairman and
Frankfurter. Perhaps because he was actively considering work on his
book about Bradley,296 Fairman did not take the occasion to examine
Bradley's life critically.29
7
XIII. "CROSSKEY IS VERY MUCH WITH ME."
2 9 8
In 1953, William W. Crosskey's controversial The Constitution in
the History of the United States was published. At the time, its publi-
293. Hints of this are also seen in Fairman's article citing cases from the 1930s and 1940s.
Granger Cases, supra note 34, at 659, 661 n.337, 670 n.382.
294. FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 81.
295. Granger Cases, supra note 34, at 587. Bradley termed this document an "Outline of my
views on the subject of the Granger Cases." Fairman reproduced this document. Id. at 670-78.
296. Id. at 587 n.1, indicating that the article was "incident to work on a forthcoming book,
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1870-1892." Fairman's private comment to
Frankfurter that the article was too long to be a chapter and would have to be made shorter,
suggests the contrary. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 23, 1953) (on file
with Harvard Law School).
297. Fairman had no critical analysis of the fact that Frederick T. Frelinghuysen argued
before Justice Bradley in the Granger Cases. While Fairman noted that Frelinghuysen had been
Bradley's "classmate at Rutgers, and his associate at the bar," Granger Cases, supra note 34, at
644, he apparently did not deem it important to note the critical role Frelinghuysen played in
Bradley's appointment to the Court. See Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to
the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1128 (1941). Even
though Frelinghuysen did not prevail in the Granger Cases, the question of whether Bradley
should have participated in a case in which Frelinghuysen played such a prominent role either
did not occur to Fairman or was deferred until his book should be published.
Fairman uncritically praised Bradley's majority opinion upholding Congress's act declaring
all of the property of the Mormon Church forfeit. Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice, 1
STAN. L. REV. 217, 218 (1949). Yet Fuller's biographer termed Fuller's dissent to that decision
"short and devastating" and "one of the greatest glories of Fuller's career." WILLARD L. KING,
MELVILLE WESTON FULLER 147 (1967). See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). Congress later acknowledged its error and re-
turned the property to the Mormon Church.
This was one of the few times that Fairman acknowledged that Miller, even "at a moment
when Bradley had disappointed him as to a recommendation or a judicial appointment," had
been critical of Bradley or that a quote attributed to Justice Strong might be interpreted as being
critical of Bradley. Granger Cases, supra note 34, at 653 n.306.
While Fairman refused to credit John Bingham for his 1872 explanation of the steps in his
reasoning in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 because it was not contemporaneous,
Fairman, supra note 206, at 137, Fairman uncritically accepted Justice Bradley's October 28, 1882
letter explaining his role in the Electoral Commission of 1877. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note
34, at 79-80 (reprinting letter).
298. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (May 20, 1953) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
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cation was "the major event in constitutional scholarship. '' 299 Cross-
key's research led him to envision a constitution in which judicial
review was limited and the power of Congress' power over commerce
was omnipotent. As a commentator later wrote, Crosskey's view was
"in short, the Constitution Franklin Roosevelt would have written in
1935.,"300
In the autumn of that year the University of Chicago Law Review
published a symposium reviewing Crosskey's work.301 Three of the
reviews were quite favorable.
Fairman, having apparently been asked to limit his review to Part
V of Crosskey's work, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Lim-
itations on State Governmental Authority,3 2 reached a completely dif-
ferent judgment. He concluded that the book was "not candid and
objective" and that it results had to be viewed with "the greatest skep-
ticism and reserve.
'30 3
Part of Fairman's disagreement with Crosskey was over how the
Constitution should be interpreted. Fairman was far more willing
than Crosskey to depart from the text and allow a judicial develop-
ment of the meaning of the text through adjudication. 304 Crosskey
insisted on looking to contemporary sources to determine the original
meaning of the text. 30 5 Fairman devoted most of his thirty-eight page
review of Crosskey's work to the single question of whether Barron v.
299. Pinkup BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1982).
300. Id. at 15.
301. Abe Krash, A More Perfect Union The Constitutional World of William Winslow Cross-
key, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1953); Charles E. Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie- Tompkins, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 24 (1953); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 40
(1953); Walton H. Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 79
(1953).
In addition to these four reviews, the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, AUGUST 1952 TO
JULY 1955, at 849 (Dorothea A. Flaherty ed., 1955), lists thirty reviews of Crosskey's work. Abe
Krash, who studied under Crosskey at the University of Chicago, returned to this subject in
1984, noting that it was "difficult to recall any book.., on a legal subject... published in the last
fifty years which occasioned such rancorous controversy and which evoked such profoundly di-
vergent views." Abe Krash, The Legacy of William Crosskey, 93 YALE L.J. 959, 960 (1984)
(book review) [hereinafter The Legacy of William Crosskey].
302. Fairman, supra note 301, at 41. Fairman was writing his review as early as May 1953.
As if Crosskey's book was a matter they had discussed before, Fairman wrote Frankfurter about
the Chicago Symposium: "Crosskey is very much with me." Letter from Charles Fairman to
Felix Frankfurter (May 20, 1953) (on file with Harvard Law School).
303. Fairman, supra note 301, at 78.
304. Id. at 40-41.
305. But Crosskey rejected the Federalist Papers and Madison's notes of the Constitutional
Convention as reliable sources. Indeed, he accused Madison of falsifying his notes. WILIAM W.
CROSSKEY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THm HISTORY OF THE UMTED STATES 1012 (1953).
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Baltimore,3o6 which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states, was incorrectly decided as Crosskey claimed.307
Following a procedure similar to that used in his Stanford article
on the Fourteenth Amendment,30 8 Fairman examined the state ratifi-
cation conventions of the United States Constitution, the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, and post-Bill of Rights actions by various states,
concentrating upon instances in which they did not honor the Bill of
Rights in their own state proceedings. This is one of Fairman's most
powerful writings and, when read in conjunction with Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Barron and the legislative history,30 9 is persua-
sive as to the correctness of the Barron decision.
While most of Fairman's article was written in the same scholarly,
temperate tone as his 1949 Stanford piece, at times it is surprisingly
harsh.310 In the course of his review, Fairman accused Crosskey of
"lacking candor" and failing to act with "fundamental fairness," 31' not
being "frank, ' 31 2 "suppressing" evidence contrary to his views,313 and
306. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
307. It is not entirely clear why Fairman chose to focus upon this largely settled claim. He
stated only that "[i]t seemed wise to select" this aspect for discussion. Fairman, supra note 301, at
43. It may be that Fairman felt that the Fourteenth Amendment debate was "moot" after his
"definitive" work in Stanford's Law Review, and therefore Crosskey's claim could prevail, if at
all, only by a reversal of Barron. But, in the modem reader's eye, the Barron argument is the
weaker of Crosskey's views. Read in this light, it is possible that Fairman focussed upon the
Barron argument because he viewed it as Crosskey's most vulnerable point.
It may also have been that Crosskey's conclusion on Barron v. Baltimore was an anathema
to Fairman because of Fairman's dislike of the jury-related provisions themselves and because it
would strengthen Justice Black's views in Adamson.
308. Compare Fairman, supra note 301 with Fairman, supra note 206 (Stanford article).
309. See Paul F'mkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990
Sup. Or. REv. 301.
310. This may be in response to Crosskey's harsh words. Crosskey treated Fairman's 1949
Stanford article only in a footnote. WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, II POLxncs AND THE CONSTIrrUON
1381 n.11 (1953). Crosskey questioned the "adequacy" and the "handling" of evidence by Fair-
man. Crosskey termed Fairman's evidence "illegitimate" and then, later, "doubly illegitimate."
Ild.
Even one of Crosskey's admirers commented upon his own language stating that [Crosskey]
"has seemingly courted opposition by the truculence with which he presents his views and the
virulence of his condemnation of the politicians." Clark, supra note 301, at 27; see also id. at 28
(speaking of Crosskey's "combativeness" and his making the disputes between different historic
actors "so personal").
The London Times Literary Supplement described Crosskey's work as "contentious and
pugnacious." The American Constitution, THE TIMEs LrrERARY SUPPLEMENT (London) Jan. 8,
1954, at 27.
311. Fairman, supra note 301, at 75.
312. Id. at 50.
313. Id. at 51; see also id. at 58 (implying suppression).
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not being "candid and objective. '314 Further, there are a number of
passages in which Fairman is strikingly condescending.
315
Though the substance of Fairman's critique is beyond the scope
of this inquiry, two matters on the manner in which Fairman made his
critique merit comment. First, following Frankfurter's lead in claiming
that the Fourteenth Amendment application of the Bill of Rights had
been supported in the Supreme Court only by Justice Harlan, Fairman
wrote, "either the Justices from 1873 on down-the whole lot of them,
except Harlan, J.-or else Mr. Crosskey, will be found to have fallen
into error that is 'remarkable in the highest degree."
316
Of course, by limiting his consideration to the year of the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases317 and to Supreme Court cases, Fairman was able to
avoid acknowledging that the two earliest cases interpreting the Four-
teenth Amendment held that it incorporated the Bill of Rights318 and
to keep from emphasizing Justice Bradley's change in position on that
issue.
However, Frankfurter was able to state that claim with accuracy
only because he excluded any discussion of the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause and focused exclusively on the Due Process Clause.
319
Fairman's claim was clearly erroneous because he articulated no due
process limit in his claim.3
20
Second, Fairman was unforgiving in his insistence that Barron
was not only the correct decision, but also the only rational possibility.
314. Id. at 72.
315. "What others have found obscure, Mr. Crosskey may suddenly pronounce crystal clear,
so that all aids to interpretation are cut off." Id. at 44. "He who would keep up with Mr. Cross-
key's argument would better be sharp." Id. "These New Hampshire statesmen ... evidently
didn't know Mr. Crosskey's 'eighteenth century constructionary rules."' Id. at 50. "One might
escape [the circularity of the argument found by Fairman] by saying, as an act of faith, that Mr.
Crosskey and such as may agree with him are the only ones who know what the Bill of Rights
really means!" Id. at 72.
316. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
317. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
318. See supra note 39.
319. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
320. It is ironic that in an article where Fairman takes Crosskey to task for the omission of
items which may or may not have been known to Crosskey, Fairman makes such an obvious
mistake on a matter with which he should have been so familiar. On the other hand, those
matters with which we are most familiar are those we are least likely to read to confirm our
recollection and it is entirely possible Fairman simply remembered Frankfurter's point, without
remembering the context well-known to both Frankfurter and Fairman. It is also possible that
Fairman was so exasperated by having to address Crosskey's research that he simply was not at
his best. Further, Fairman may have been writing under a deadline set for the Symposium. On
another occasion, Fairman complained to Frankfurter that he did not like to write under the
pressure of a deadline. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 7, 1955) (on file
with Library of Congress).
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In reaching this conclusion, Fairman ignored the opinion of William
Rawle, a respected authority relied upon by Crosskey.
Rawle was a significant and respected lawyer in his own time.321
He was sought out by President Washington to be the first Attorney
General, a position he declined.32 He later served as the U.S. District
Attorney for Philadelphia for eight years.323 Justice Story wrote fa-
vorably of Rawle's ability as an advocate. 324 Rawle's treatise was the
first one on the Constitution of the United States and was adopted as
a textbook by many "institutions of learning. 325 Thus, Crosskey was
not relying upon the interpretation of an obscure or eccentric person.
The fact that such an eminent practitioner, scholar and intellectual as
Rawle should have believed that amendments two through eight ap-
plied to the states supports the plausibility of the argument, even if
one ultimately rejects it as incorrect.
Further, the plausibility of Crosskey's claim had been supported
by Fairman's own prior research which indicated that many lawyers,
judges, and other prominent people in the 1860s were unaware of Bar-
ron and thought that the Bill of Rights applied to the states.326 For
one who was concerned about offering an "objective" study to the
321. Rawle was educated in the Middle Temple in London and admitted to the bar in Phila-
delphia in 1783. WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, HISTORICAL VOLUME, 1607-1896, at 504 (1967).
In addition to serving in the Pennsylvania legislature (1789), Rawle was active in a number of
intellectually oriented organizations. Id Rawle was a Trustee of the University of Pennsylvania
(1795-1835); a member of Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture (1805-?); a founder of
the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts (1805); a director of the Library Company of Philadel-
phia; a founder of the Society for the Promotion of Legal Knowledge and Forensic Elegance
(1820); Chancellor of the Society Association of Members of the Bar (1822); and 1st President of
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Id In 1833, Rawle was appointed to a 3-person Commis-
sion to revise the Pennsylvania civil code. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR 528 (1912).
322. DAVID P. BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 15 (1837).
323. WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, supra note 321, at 504.
324. WILLIAM W. STORY, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 163 (1971).
325. Id. at 38.
326. For example, Fairman quoted an exchange between Representative and former Judge
Robert S. Hale indicating that while Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham was aware of
Barron and its effect, Judge Hale was unaware of Barron's existence and thought the Bill of
Rights applied to the states. Fairman, supra note 206, at 29-34. Further, in analyzing the debates
at the Nevada Constitutional Convention of 1864, Fairman noted that an individual delegate had
acted as if the Fifth and Seventh Amendments applied to the states. According to Fairman,
"[h]ere is a reminder, at a moment when the Fourteenth Amendment was not even conceived,
that men might never have heard of Barron v. Baltimore and might read the federal Bill of
Rights as applying to the state as well as the Federal Government." Id. at 102 (footnote
omitted).
One year before Fairman's Chicago article, Howard Graham publicly identified a case in
Illinois which indicated that "the whole Illinois Supreme Court [was] apparently unaware" of
Barron and indicated that the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states. Howard J. Graham,
Procedure to Substance, Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CAL. L. REV. 483, 487
(1952) (citing and quoting Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. 375, 414 (1845)).
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public, and not "a brief, '327 Fairman's certitude on this question is
puzzling.
Though Frankfurter read Fairman's review of Crosskey's work in
the original issue of the University of Chicago Law Journal, it was not
until after he had received a reprint of Fairman's critique that he ex-
pressed his "deep appreciation for this new manifestation by you of
scholarship at its best." 328 While Frankfurter was "edified" by Fair-
man's performance, he was "depressed by some of the arrogant dog-
matism and intellectual cowardice of the other reviewers." 329
Frankfurter's letter ended with the hope "that your Bradley is
progressing. 330
An intriguing aspect of the Crosskey/Fairman debate was the
view of this dispute as part of a larger dispute between Harvard and
Yale. 331 Fairman, with his close connections to Harvard, was the only
critical reviewer of Crosskey in the Chicago symposium, while
favorable reviews came from Judge Charles E. Clark, the former
Dean of Yale School of Law,33 2 and Walton H. Hamilton, the
Southmayd Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale. 333
Even at Crosskey's death in 1968, his former colleague on the
University of Chicago faculty, Malcolm P. Sharp, claimed that Cross-
key's book "annoyed" Harvard and Columbia because the professors
there "could not understand it" and that Crosskey's findings were "so
startling, at least at Harvard, that they apparently elude the unsophis-
For a modem summary of the extent to which others reached conclusions contrary to Bar-
ron, both before and after it was issued, see Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1203-12 (1992).
327. Fairman, supra note 301, at 51; see also letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter
(Jan. 13, 1952) (on file with Harvard Law School) (lamenting that an unidentified speaker at the
Vanderbilt symposium had accused Fairman's Stanford article of being a "brief").
328. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Nov. 3, 1953) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
329. Id. Earlier Frankfurter wrote to Paul Freund concerning Fairman's review, concluding
that "[i]f the world of scholarship had a rigorous code of honor, that book would.., find a
permanent place on the scrap-heap." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund (Oct. 14,
1953) (on file with Library of Congress).
330. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Nov. 3, 1953) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
331. Stanley Katz quoted Henry Hart's review, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1456 (1954), in his review of the Harvard/Yale situation for the first Crosskey
lecture. Stanley H. Katz, William Winslow Crosskey, 19 LAw SCH. REc. 20, 21 (1972).
332. 4 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA, 1961-1968, at 174 (1968).
333. Hamilton, supra note 301, at 79, n.+.
The third favorable reviewer, Abe Krash, had been Crosskey's student at the University of
Chicago.
[Vol. 70:1197
1995] FAIRMAN, FRANKFURTER, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1249
ticated reader."' 334 In contrast, Sharp indicated that the book's publi-
cation "delighted" Yale.
335
By November 18, 1953, Fairman received the entire issue of the
Chicago symposium. Apparently upset by the praise for Crosskey,
Fairman complained to Frankfurter that this was "exactly what I had
foreseen." 3
36
In response to the fact that Crosskey's undergraduate and law
degrees were from Yale, 337 Fairman resurrected a slur on Yale which
he indicated he was told thirty years prior. He noted that Harvard had
"veritas" on its seal and Yale had "lux et veritas." Translating the
Latin into French and then into English,338 Fairman stated Harvard
was dedicated to truth but that at Yale truth was a luxury.339 "So far
as Yale Law School is concerned, that, to me, seems true. For years
the place has fostered gutter urchins, exhibitionists, slight of hand per-
formers-in my humble opinion." 340
In a December 28, 1953 letter, Frankfurter asked if there had
been any "aftermath" to Fairman's review of Crosskey's book.341
Fairman related that while at the AALS Conference in Chicago he
asked Professor Philip Kurland if he should expect hostility from the
University of Chicago law faculty and was told no. According to Fair-
man this appeared to be true.342
Fairman related that during the course of the convention he saw
Professor Crosskey once or twice, recognized his name on his name
tag and assumed that Crosskey recognized Fairman's name on his
334. Malcolm P. Sharp, The Master, 35 U. Cmi. L. REv. 238, 242 (1968); see also Charles 0.
Gregory, William Winslow Crosskey-As I Remember Him, 35 U. Cmi. L. REv. 243, 245 (1968)
("so cold-shouldered as he was by the Harvard people").
The reference to Columbia was probably a response to Columbia Law School Professor
Julius Goebel's critical review of Crosskey's work. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 450 (1954).
335. Sharp, supra note 334, at 238.
336. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 18, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress).
337. AALS DIRECroRY OF LAW TEACHERS 110 (1961) (A.B. 1923; LL.B. 1926).
338. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 18, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress) ("ia veritd c'est une affare de luxe!").
339. I am grateful to David C. Jamison, Sr. Vice President and Provost of The University of
Akron and a member of the adjunct faculty of the School of Law, for his assistance in reading
Fairman's handwriting and translating Fairman's French.
340. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 18, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress).
341. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Dec. 28, 1953) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
342. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 23, 1954) (on file with Library of
Congress) ("& so it appeared").
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name tag, "but there seemed no purpose in seeking personal
acquaintance. 343
Fairman indicated that Stanford Law Review had offered Cross-
key an opportunity to reply to Fairman and concluded, "I believe he
can't better his position by any further explanation."' 344 Still, Fairman
could not help but relate to Frankfurter the following account of Fair-
man, Thomas Reed Powell and Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark
in a lounge at the AALS gathering. "Reed made quite a crack at the
Crosskey book. Judge Clark seemed to wince, but didn't offer
battle."345
Continuing their mutual fascination with Crosskey, Frankfurter
responded by making sure that Fairman had noted The Times Literary
Supplement's "penetrating" review of Crosskey.346 He also praised
Fairman's review of W. Shiras's biography of Justice George Shiras,
Jr.347
In spite of Fairman's belief that Crosskey would not reply, Cross-
key was not one to take Fairman's critique in silence. The autumn
1954 issue of the Chicago Law Review brought a 143-page reply to
Fairman's book review and also to Fairman's 1949 Stanford article.348
This article was divided into two parts. Part I consisted of 119 pages
supporting Crosskey's views on the incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Part II contained twenty-five pages on Barron.349
Crosskey indicated that much of Part I was the result of research
which he had done for the, legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but decided not to include in his book.350 In many ways,
Crosskey met Fairman on his own ground. He placed the views of




346. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Jan. 29, 1954) (on file with Library of
Congress). This review was apparently The American Constitution, THE TIMES LITERARY SUP-
PLEMENT (London), Jan. 8, 1954, at 27.
347. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Jan. 29, 1954) (on file with Library of
Congress). See Charles Fairman, Book Review, 63 YALE L.J. 431 (1954) (reviewing GEORGE
SHIRAS, III, JUSTICE GEORGE SHIRAS, JR., OF PITTSBURGH, ASSOCIATE JUsTIcE OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1892-1903; A CHRONICLE OF His FAMILY, LIFE, AND TIMES (1953)).
Fairman indicated that Shiras was neither a "great" nor a "colorful" Justice, but that "[w]e
are the wiser for this biography which treats him respectfully and affectionately, but without any
excessive claim." Id. at 431, 434.
348. William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History,' and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CIi. L. REV. 1 (1954).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 2 n.6.
351. ld. at 11-20, 66-69, 88-100.
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gested that Fairman's survey of newspapers had been inadequate and
was far more favorable than Fairman suggested, 353 and argued that
many of the conflicts which Fairman found between state constitutions
or statutes and the Bills of Rights did not exist or did not have the
interpretative power Fairman claimed for them.354 On the question of
Barron, Crosskey responded point-by-point to Fairman's critique.3 55
Crosskey's article was, for the most part, written in a temperate
and scholarly manner. But, just as Fairman had harsh words for Cross-
key, Crosskey had harsh words for Fairman. These included refer-
ences to "[t]he illegitimacy of Mr. Fairman's whole effort", 356 his
"mishandling of the evidence," 357 his misconstruction of evidence, 358
the "patent absurdity of the proposition he sought to establish, '359 as
well as rather contemptuous statement that he had originally felt no
need to counter Fairman's 1949 Stanford article because "Mr. Fair-
man's article was its own refutation.
' '360
Though the Crosskey/Fairman writings on Barron have been
largely ignored, Fairman's 1949 Stanford article and Crosskey's 1954
University of Chicago article were considered, as late as 1968, to be
"the only full-dress discussion[s] of [the incorporation debate] in legal
periodicals" and "far more comprehensive than any of the United
States Supreme Court cases on this point."'361
Fairman apparently made a trip to Washington and visited with
Justice Frankfurter in early May 1954. Frankfurter probably gave him
a copy of the Court's opinion in Barsky v. Board of Regents362 in
352. Id. at 77-84.
353. Id. at 100-04.
354. Id. at 104-14.
355. The exchange was fairly evenly balanced in terms of length. Fairman's initial article
contained thirty-eight pages on Barron. Crosskey's reply on this point was twenty-five pages.
The same is true on the Fourteenth Amendment question. Fairman's Stanford article was 139
pages, while Crosskey's reply devoted 119 pages to the Fourteenth Amendment question.
356. Crosskey, supra note 348, at 10; see also id. at 117.
357. Id. at 10.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 54.
360. Id. at 2 n.6. Crosskey criticized Fairman in a footnote in his book. CROSSKEY, supra
note 305, at 1381 n.11.
361. Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revis-
ited, 6 HARV. J. oN LEGIS. 1, 3 (1968).
Avins himself was intimately familiar with the debates from this era, having written many
articles on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and compiled the invaluable
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (1967). In surveying the evidence on the incor-
poration debate, Avins found Crosskey to have had the better part of the argument. Id. at 11.
362. 347 U.S. 442 (1954). Dr. Barsky's medical license was suspended for six months because
he refused to produce certain papers subpoenaed by a Congressional Committee.
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which Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter wrote separate dissents on
due process grounds.363
Frankfurter apparently asked Fairman to read his dissent to see if
there were any additional legal grounds upon which Barsky's convic-
tion could be attacked.364 Fairman found none, but was disturbed by
Black's dissent which he apparently interpreted as a substantive due
process argument. "To be willing to sit under an oak and to do what
seems right and just, case by case, as complaint is made and then to
repudiate Palko as an invocation of the law of nature-surely a reflec-
tive view would see that here is inconsistency. '365 But the discussion
of Barsky provided only an interlude from Crosskey.
Fairman was given an opportunity to reply to Crosskey's article.
Fairman's response to Crosskey's reply began even before Crosskey's
official publication and provides an interesting window into Fairman's
relationship with Justice Frankfurter and his views of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In an August 16, 1954 letter to Frankfurter, Fairman discussed
what he found in Justice Miller's papers and then moved on to a
"[n]ew and less interesting topic. ' 366 Fairman now acknowledged that
"Crosskey was bound to make an attempted reply," because "[t]he
glove has been so conspicuously left on the ground. '367 Fairman was
given an opportunity to reply to Crosskey and sent a copy of his ac-
ceptance of the invitation to Frankfurter. 8 In sending carbon copies
of part of Crosskey's reply to Frankfurter, Fairman indicated it would
"spoil a day of your life. ' 369
Fairman, sounding much like he was preparing the "brief" which
he had previously condemned, 370 outlined for Frankfurter the strategy
363. Justice Black's dissent seems to focus upon the lack of procedures ("not a tribunal oper-
ating within the ordinary safeguards of law"). Id. at 459 (Black J., dissenting). Justice Frank-
furter's dissent was based more upon arbitrariness. Id. at 470 (Frankfurter J., dissenting)
(grounds for loss of medical license must have "some ration to the qualifications," and not be
based upon "grounds having no possible relation to fitness"). Thus, Black's dissent was based
more upon what we would term procedural due process, while Frankfurter's was based more
upon what we would term substantive due process.
Black also argued that the action was based upon an unlawful attainder published by the
United State Attorney General and improperly used in the New York proceeding.
364. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (May 16, 1954) (on file with Library
of Congress).
365. Id.





370. Fairman, supra note 302, at 51.
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of his reply to Crosskey. Fairman did not want to "leave [Crosskey] in
possession of the field because so many people had been emotionally
drawn to his thesis" and this "seeming flight would be hailed by many
as a surrender."' 371 On the other hand, Fairman concluded "[i]t would
be a sad error to follow [Crosskey] once more into the bog of Con-
gressional debates of '66."
Instead, Fairman planned to make general observations of meth-
odology, reflect on the problems of applying the jury provisions to the
states, and leave "the case, on the present record, to thoughtful read-
ers. ' 372 Fairman asked Frankfurter for "[a]ny comments" he might
have on Fairman's strategy in dealing with Crosskey.
373
By August 25, 1954, Fairman had received the galleys of Cross-
key's Part II and was therefore able to send a carbon copy of Part II to
Frankfurter. In doing so, he indicated that he would "inflict some
more unhappiness" upon Frankfurter. 374 A note at the bottom of the
August 25th letter indicated Fairman's awkwardness about sharing his
ideas with Frankfurter and seeking his advice: "Destroy the papers
when you've no further use for them. '375
Again, Fairman revealed his approach to the disagreements about
the Fourteenth Amendment. "It seems to me rather a matter of pub-
lic relations than of law. I felt that to become too deeply committed
would be an error. To let myself be put on the defense would be an
error."3
76
Fairman appears to have followed his "public relations" plan. In
the first part of his reply, Fairman responded somewhat specifically to
Crosskeys' view of Barron.377 But, with rare exception, he avoided the
"bog" of the 1866 Congressional debates and did not confront the di-
rect citations to the record which Crosskey provided. Instead, he sum-
marized portions of his prior Stanford piece, which were often non-
responsive.378 Where Fairman did make specific responses, he went
too far.
371. Id.
372. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 16, 1954) (on file with Library
of Congress). This same letter indicated that Fairman was in Washington D.C. for a fifteen-day
special assignment for the Judge Advocate General Corps and that he would work on his reply
to Crosskey in the evening. Id.
373. Id.
374. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 25, 1954) (on file with Library
of Congress).
375. Id.
376. Id. (emphasis added).
377. Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 144 (1954).
378. Id. at 151-54.
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For example, to help clarify the meaning of Bingham's shortest
speech upon any of his Fourteenth Amendment proposals, Crosskey
suggested that Bingham "may very well simply have held the docu-
ment up."'3 79 While that was a possible action, Fairman was absolutely
correct when he noted that Crosskey had no evidence this actually
happened.
Not satisfied with that point, Fairman tried to make it appear that
Crosskey's hypothetical was improbable: "Did so intelligent a man
have to keep the Constitution with him in order to quote its
phases?" 380 This reflected the lack of breadth of Fairman's reading.
At least in the early days of the Republic every Congressman had a
printed copy of the Constitution on his desk in the House.381 A
source available to Fairman indicated that, at least in the 1840s, Bing-
ham did carry a "pocket edition" of the Constitution with him to use
in his speeches. 382 Reading from constitutional treatises in Congress
was not uncommon. 383 The balanced point to be made was that we
simply do not know what, if anything, Bingham held in his hand dur-
379. Crosskey, supra note 348, at 28. Much of Fairman's Fourteenth Amendment interpreta-
tion turned upon Fairman's claim that when John Bingham referred to the Bill of Rights, he was
not referring to the first eight or the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Rather, Fairman
claimed Bingham was referring only to the Fifth Amendment and Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution as "the" Bill of Rights. This was based upon a short speech on February 26, 1866,
where Bingham, after discussing the Fifth Amendment and Article IV, Section 2, proceeded to
talk about "this" (rather than "the") Bill of Rights.
As Crosskey pointed out, if Bingham had held a copy of the Constitution in his hand and
was referring to it, then Fairman's interpretation would not stand, just as it would not if there
was an error of speech or transcription which rendered the word "the" as "that." See Aynes,
supra note 39, at 68 n.61.
In any event, it is difficult to understand how Fairman could have held this view if he read
the debates of Congress for the next two days. On February 27, 1866, in an exchange with Bing-
ham, Representative Robert S. Hale indicated that the first ten amendments "constitute the bill
of rights." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866). The following day, Bingham gave
his much quoted speech about overruling Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (just
compensation clause, Fifth Amendment), and Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833)
(Seventh Amendment jury case). This was a speech which was carried in its title when it was
published for mass distributions "in support of the proposed amendment to enforce the [B]ill of
[R]ights." Aynes, supra note 39, at 72.
Bingham's other speeches make it unmistakable either that Fairman's reading of this speech
was wrong or Bingham changed his views in later speeches. For my own analysis of the most
reasonable reading of this speech and its context see Aynes, supra note 39, at 68 n.61.
380. Fairman, supra note 377, at 152. This may have been a subtle reference to Justice Black
who was known to carry the Constitution with him. NEWMAN, supra note 157, at 568.
381. 22 ANNALS OF CONOREss 627 (1853).
382. WALTER G. SHOTWELL, DRIFTWOOD 81 (1927) (giving these words as Bingham's: "Al-
most everything was reduced to a Constitutional question, in those days [1840s]. I read from a
pocket edition I carried ....").
383. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1871) (Representative Garfield: "I hold in my
hand Paschal's annotated edition of the Constitution .... ); see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1363 (1870) (Senator Trumbull: "I read from Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, a recent
and valuable work.").
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ing that speech. But Fairman was overreaching when he tried to as-
sert that it was improbable that Bingham held a copy of the
Constitution.
384
A similar difficulty is evident in Fairman's charge that Crosskey
"cheerfully goes along with rewriting Article IV, Section 2," without
recognizing that he, Fairman, was doing the same.385 Again, Fairman
returned Crosskey's harsh language in kind.38 6
384. Ultimately, of course, Fairman was simply wrong in his statement of Bingham's views.
Aynes, supra note 39.
The question of how Crosskey could be generally correct on his Fourteenth Amendment
research and generally wrong on his Commerce Clause/judicial review research is an intriguing
one.
Crosskey rejected the plain meaning of the Constitution and denied the authenticity and
authority of Madison's account of the history of the Constitutional Convention. While Crosskey
extensively used contemporary sources, he did so only in an attempt to contradict the plain
meaning of the Constitution and its legislative history.
When he examined the Fourteenth Amendment, however, Crosskey took a completely dif-
ferent approach. He accepted the plain meaning of the amendment and relied upon the legisla-
tive history in the Congressional Globe. In accepting these traditional sources of authority,
Crosskey worked in a normal legal tradition and reached a reasonable conclusion.
It is ironic that even though Fairman and Crosskey were each other's nemesis, Fairman's
work was the mirror image of Crosskey's work. On the question of Barron v. Baltimore, for
example, Fairman was successful because he accepted the logic of the Barron decision, reached a
conclusion consistent with the language of the Constitution, and did not challenge conventional
sources of legislative history.
On the other hand, Fairman seems to have adopted much of Crosskey's Commerce Clause
approach in his own Fourteenth Amendment research. Rather than looking to the plain lan-
guage of the amendment and relying upon a reasonable reading of the Congressional debates,
Fairman attempted to discredit traditional sources of legislative history (the views of the author
of the amendment in the House and its Floor Manager in the Senate), creating a confused and
incoherent account of the debates which allowed him to undermine the plain meaning of the
amendment.
Thus, the enduring portions of Fairman's and Crosskey's works can be identified by the
instances in which they used traditional sources of legislative history to create a coherent reading
of the purpose of portions of the Constitution which is consistent with the plain meaning of the
text. They failed when they attempted to defeat the plain meaning of the text by undermining
traditional sources of legislative history.
385. Article IV, Section 2 reads, "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
Bingham treated the clause as if there was an ellipses to explain the meaning of "citizens"
the second time it appears. The first time it appears, it is modified by "of each State." The
second time, it stands alone. Bingham specifically said that there was an ellipses and read the
words "of the United States" into the clause. CONo. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
Crosskey endorsed that view as Bingham's view and that of Howard and other framers. Cross-
key, supra note 348, at 12-13.
Fairman read the clause as "Citizens OF the several states" as Justice Miller read it in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), rather than as "Citizens IN the several
states." It is revealing that Fairman acted as if he were reading Article IV, Section 2 without any
changes and fails to acknowledge his change of the word "of" to "in."
386. "[T]his prepossessed obtuseness to the elementary requirements of scholarly candor is
the most significant feature of [Crosskey's] work." Fairman, supra note 377, at 145. "If nothing
of real moment were involved in all this, one would gladly avoid irritating Mr. Crosskey, as
Polonius humored Hamlet: the cloud is indeed like a camel... backed like a weasel ... and very
like a whale. But this is a constitution we are expounding." Id. at 152.
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Having to think about these matters again, to deal with one
whom Fairman thought was clearly wrong, and to be confronted on his
own evidence, was something which Fairman did not enjoy. Indeed, it
is difficult to read the Fairman/Frankfurter correspondence of this pe-
riod without recalling Fairman's own words concerning Justice Miller
and wondering whether they did not apply to Fairman as well. "We
seek to remake the world after our own mental images. When a man is
confident of his intellectual processes and ambitious to see his conclu-
sions materialized he is impatient with narrow-visioned
opposition. "387
Fairman's exasperation was illustrated in the conclusion of his
August 25, 1954 letter to Frankfurter where he indicated that he
mailed his reply "and shall put it out of mind, to get on with more
interesting things. ' 388 Though the letter is apparently unavailable, it
appears that Frankfurter responded with encouraging words to Fair-
man. In Fairman's October 19, 1954 letter he thanked Frankfurter for
his note in reference to "the sorry Crosskey business. It gave me real
comfort .... *"389
XIV. LIFE AFTER CROSSKEY
Fairman was able to move beyond Crosskey and work on other
projects. Frankfurter was no doubt pleased to see Fairman's sketch of
Justice Bradley as part of a collection of biographical sketches which
was published in 1956.390 In this work, Fairman had only high praise
for Justice Bradley.391 The question of what earned Bradley that
387. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 425; see also Fairman, supra note 31, at 41.
388. FALRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 54, at 425
389. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 19, 1954) (on file with Library of
Congress). The same letter indicated that a "thought" Frankfurter sent to Fairman was not re-
ceived in time for use in the response to Crosskey, but was used by Fairman in a later speech on
Justice Bradley. ld
390. MR. JusTIcE (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956; rev. ed. 1964). The
sketches were of John Marshall, Roger B. Taney, Joseph P. Bradley, John Marshall Harlan, Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Charles Evans Hughes, Louis D. Brandeis, George Sutherland, Harlan F.
Stone, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Frank Murphy, and Wiley Rutledge. The sketch of Marshall was
written by W. W. Crosskey.
391. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34, at 70 (Bradley was a "great jurist", "wise counselor,"
and a "great figure in the law of the Commerce Clause."). "In the vigor of his intellect, in his
complete mastery of his profession, and in the wide range of his thought, Bradley was a great
Justice. There have been few from whom one can learn so much." Id. at 71. "Bradley [was] a
skeptical, tough, relentless person, pushing to the very truth and reason of things .. " Id. at 73.
"[E]very period of his life was a season of greatness .... " Id. at 92. "[Bradley] ranks high
among the exemplars of the Court's best wisdom." Id. at 93. Bradley, along with Miller and
Field, was "one of the three most important figures in a crucial period of the Supreme Court's
history. They were the giants of those days." Id. at 70.
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praise provides insight into Fairman's view and, perhaps,
Frankfurter's.
Though Fairman was not explicit about the basis of his judgment,
his article suggested that he valued Bradley's personal traits: a Hora-
tio Alger type of growth from apparent poverty, 392 a strong desire for
an education,393 and an ability to act with judicial detachment-to de-
cide cases against the interest of railroads even though he had been a
railroad lawyer.394 It was these cases, Bradley's recognition of the
public's right to regulate corporations, and Bradley's Commerce
Clause cases which Fairman valued most.395
While Fairman gave an account of Justice Bradley's lower court
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases and even quoted a portion in
response to his own question, "[w]hat were the essential privileges
guaranteed by the new amendment?, ' 396 he omitted any reference to
Bradley's support in that very opinion for the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights enforceable against
the states. 397
Given his recent dispute with Crosskey, and the unresolved na-
ture of the incorporation issue before the Supreme Court, discussion
of this aspect of Bradley's opinion would have been particularly rele-
vant. But perhaps the most important clue to Fairman's thinking is his
conclusion that the greatest quality "to be expected" of a Justice of
the United States Supreme Court is "statesmanship" because this is its
392. Fairman implies a comparison between Bradley's ascent and Abraham Lincoln's ascent.
Id. at 69.
393. Id. at 73.
394. Id. at 88-89. But note the intriguing reference in John P. Stockton's letter to Bradley,
March 16, 1870, which can be read to imply that some of the "national" railroad interests were
opposed to Bradley and raised the possibility that the interests of certain "national" railroads
may have been different than that of the Amboy and Camden railroad for which Bradley
worked. Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, 54 HARv. L. REv. 977 (1941).
395. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34, at 70. (Bradley was a "great figure in the law of the
Commerce Clause.").
396. Id. at 82.
397. See Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408) (police regulations "can-
not [interfere with liberty of conscience, or with the entire equality of all creeds and religions
before the law. Nor can they] ... interfere with the fundamental privileges and immunities of
American citizens."). In his Supreme Court dissent, Bradley wrote that the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens were "specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amend-
ments of it." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J,. dissent-
ing). Bradley specifically listed trial by jury, free exercise of religious worship, free speech, free
press, the right of assembly, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and due
process as privileges and immunities. Id.
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"highest" function. 398 Bradley ranked so high in Fairman's estimation
because he was an exemplar of "the Court's best wisdom.
'399
In what appears to be an irrelevant paragraph, but may, in fact,
be a veiled reference to Crosskey, Fairman praised the "severe tests"
the law imposed upon "the most reliable evidence" and then com-
plained about how "credulous" lawyers are in other contexts. "One
writes a book, and lo, he becomes an authority. How often a court is
invited to accept some professor's statement about the past, based,
perhaps, upon shaky evidence that would never stand up against rigor-
ous examination. "4W
On October 9, 1954, Justice Robert Jackson, a friend of both Fair-
man and Frankfurter, died. On February 7, 1955, Fairman sent Frank-
furter an advanced copy of his memorial piece on Justice Jackson
401
and asked for Frankfurter comments on that article. ° 2 Frankfurter
apparently replied, resulting in at least one correction to Fairman's
manuscript.4o3
Properly eschewing any "critical appraisal" of Justice Jackson,4°4
Fairman's memorial was a fitting and appropriate tribute to an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court who had passed away. For purposes
of this article, the most interesting note in the tribute is found on a
single page where Fairman likened Justice Jackson to Justice Miller-
great lawyers who "developed [their] powers in a small town"-and to
Justice Bradley, in that his commerce power cases made him "pre-
eminent in his day. '' 4o5 This was the highest praise Fairman could
give.
In 1955, Fairman accepted an offer to teach at Harvard Law
School. Justice Black later told biographer Roger K. Newman that he
"believed Frankfurter 'got' Fairman to write [his 1949 Stanford] article
and that Fairman did it 'to get the job at Harvard."'
4°6
398. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34, at 92.
399. Id. at 93.
400. Id. at 72.
401. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 7, 1955) (on file with Library of
Congress); see Fairman, supra note 66.
402. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 7, 1955) (on file with Library of
Congress).
403. See letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 6, 1955) (on file with Library
of Congress) ("Of course I'm very grateful for your reaction to the piece on Jackson, J. I have
corrected the slip on my reference to Screws ... .
404. Fairman, supra note 401, at 445.
405. Id. at 464.
406. NEWMAN, supra note 157, at 356-57.
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It was natural for Justice Black to have suspected that Frank-
furter prodded Fairman to write his rebuttal to Black's Adamson dis-
sent,4 07 but it now appears that Fairman wrote the article on his own
initiative. While Fairman may have been ambitious and it is true that
authoring such a successful article may well have assisted him in ob-
taining his position at Harvard, there is nothing to suggest that when
he wrote this particular article, it would have advanced his career any
more than any of his other articles.4 08
On June 15, 1956, Fairman wrote about his writing of the fore-
word to the Harvard Law Review.4°9 The idea he wanted to convey
was that "if we will only relax [and] listen, the history of this country
will show the values that have proved of enduring validity-[and] that
doubtless will continue to be valued, notably, equal protection. '410
Though Fairman admitted that there was nothing "profound" about
the idea, he nevertheless found it hard to elaborate upon it. "The long
view is not familiar to the run of people. I think so much of the prob-
lem of Miller, Bradley, etc., that now and then I catch myself dating
letters in the 19th Century!" 41'
Frankfurter's response showed him taking the initiative to try to
help Fairman on his Harvard piece. "Why don't you try out on me,
with some particularity, the thought with which you are carrying your-
407. Such a view could begin, of course, with a simple knowledge of the relationship between
Justice Frankfurter and Charles Fairman. This could have logically led Justice Black to be suspi-
cious about any work of Fairman's which supported Frankfurter and criticized Black. Moreover,
as noted previously, there was a decided change in Fairman's writing style in the Stanford piece,
an air of ambiguity and innuendo in contrast to his clear and forthright style in previous writings.
Fairman was not shy about mentioning Justice Black's name in his article. But even though
citations to Justice Frankfurter's opinion would have bolstered his own article and even though
he used some of the same arguments as previously advanced by Justice Frankfurter, Frank-
furter's name does not appear in Fairman's 1949 article. It would appear that Fairman was delib-
erately attempting to distance himself from Frankfurter in order to make his argument more
effective.
Indeed, it was these circumstances which prompted me to look at the Fairman/Frankfurter
correspondence. But, Black's Adamson dissent threatened Fairman's own view of the Constitu-
tion, the reputation of Justice Miller, who he held in high regard, and the reputation of his friend
Justice Frankfurter. Beyond mere historical interest, these factors may well have produced the
same results set forth above.
408. See Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with
Harvard Law School) (this letter suggests to me that Fairman conceived of and implemented his
1949 Fourteenth Amendment article without any prompting from Justice Frankfurter).
409. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (June 15, 1956) (on file with Library
of Congress); see Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 term-Foreword: The Attack on the
Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. RaV. 83 (1956).
410. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (June 15, 1956) (on file with Library
of Congress).
411. Id. Taking "the long view" was a recurring theme of Fairman's. E.g., Granger Cases,
supra note 34, at 657; Charles Fairman, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. REv. 166, 168 (1935).
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self for the introductory little essay of H.L.R.'s review of the Supreme
Court next fall."'412 Frankfurter added that there was "all too little
needed critique" of the Court's performance and "all too much judg-
ment merely of the 'end-result'-a loathsome word, I suppose, be-
cause the concept behind it is loathsome."
413
Fairman's article took a somewhat different course than that out-
lined in his letter to Frankfurter. But this does not appear to be the
result of suggestions from Frankfurter, who decided to "abstain" from
comment on the draft.414 Fairman referred to his work on this article
in a September 16, 1956 letter to Frankfurter in which he wrote that
his last two months' work had kept him "in an abnormally low state of
mind-depressed by the reading" and "somewhat dispirited at the dif-
ficulty of deciding what thought to express. '415 Nevertheless, by the
16th Fairman had completed the project.
416
Frankfurter shared the view presented in Fairman's Foreword
that the Court had encountered a "storm of protest" as a result of its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.17 Because these protests
were "unjust" they were doing "enormous public harm. '418 Unlike
Herbert Wechsler's famous article,419 Fairman did not focus on the
process of the court or the legal arguments directly before the Court.
Rather, his attention was to the underlying source of the protests
themselves. Consequently, he responded to the public criticism by
political leaders as expressed on the floor of Congress, in the news
media, and in resolutions from the legislatures of five Southern
states.420 Because these criticisms were couched in legal terms, Fair-
412. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (June 21, 1956) (on file with Library
of Congress).
413. Id.
414. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Aug. 23, 1956) (on fie with Harvard
Law School). Not surprisingly, Frankfurter added, "get on with your Bradley and you will find
me more articulate." Id.
415. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 16, 1956) (on file with Library
of Congress).
416. Id.; see also letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Sept. 18, 1956) (on file
with Library of Congress).
417. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
418. Fairman, supra note 409, at 83. One of the manifestations of the harm was "a clamor to
make judicial service a qualification for appointments to the Court." Id. (footnote omitted). This
would have precluded the service of most of the Justices of the time, including Justice Frank-
furter. See THm OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit
Hall et al. eds., 1992).
419. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
420. Fairman, supra note 409, at 83.
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man's response may be properly characterized as a response in law,
but the overriding purpose was political.
One of Fairman's most interesting responses was his claim that
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate a pro-
hibition on desegregated schools. Fairman did not make fine distinc-
tions about what the amendment did and did not contemplate. 42' The
burden of his argument was much different.
Fairman pointed to section two, which provided for the reduction
of representation in the House when adult males were excluded from
the ballot, and to the common knowledge that African Americans
were at that time excluded from the right to vote without having the
state's representation reduced.422 Though not put in these words,
Fairman argued that if the Southern Congressmen were unwilling to
follow the intent of section two by reducing their own representation,
then they were estopped from arguing that the Court could follow the
intent of section one in school desegregation.423
That argument appeared in a slightly different form in response
to the claim that the determination of these types of matters should be
left to the Congress and not judicial legislation.424 "[I]t would be ut-
terly out of accord with the purpose of the 39th Congress, which
framed the amendment, that the rights of Negroes should be left to
the mercy of a Congress organized in disregard of section 2."' 425
In discussing the effect of past practices of segregation upon in-
tent, the very type of argument which Fairman found so persuasive in
his 1949 article on the Bill of Rights and his 1954 argument on Barron
v. Baltimore, Fairman echoed words which Frankfurter wrote to him.
"This business of going back to seek the original understanding at the
421. Id. at 85.
422. Id. at 84.
423. Id. at 84-85.
424. Id at 84.
425. Id. at 85. As part of his claim that it is more appropriate to have Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights vindicated by the Courts rather than by the "fluctuating views" of Congress, Fairman
included the following statement: "As our experience with the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment has
unfolded it has been the Court to which the country has looked for authentic interpretation." Id.
In the context of the discussion, this may be nothing more than an argument for enforce-
ment by the Court, as opposed to by the Congress. But the terms "authentic interpretation" have
a broader meaning. Especially in light of the Court's observation that the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment was inconclusive, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489
(1954) and Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955), this may have been a refinement of Justice Frankfurter's argument in
Adamson, i.e., that legislative history is always inadequate and we can look only to "the Court"
to determine the meaning of the Amendment.
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time the fourteenth amendment was framed is very delicate and
difficult .... *426
Fairman refined an idea expressed by the Court in Brown and,
more recently, utilized by William Nelson.4 27 "[I]n the main, the
framers did not speak to the questions we now want answered. They
were concerned with their own problems as they saw them; they were
not looking straight at ours of today."428
In responding to the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson,429 Fairman
distinguished the arguments made in Plessy, quoted portions of
Harlan's dissent, questioned whether society would be satisfied with
Booker Washington's 1895 Atlanta Exposition aspirations "for all
time," and traced the Supreme Court's segregation cases up through
McLaurin v. Oklahoma.430 These cases led "[elveryone who had
eyes" to know that "a quickened national conscience was being re-
flected in the decisions of the Supreme Court, and that Plessy v. Fer-
guson had become a very shaky precedent."'431
Finally, invoking principles articulated by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in 1949432 and the example of a United States
Supreme Court opinion authored by South Carolinian Justice James
F. Brynes,433 Fairman argued for not being bound by "an old decision
that now seemed out of accord with the enduring purpose of the Con-
stitution. '4M "There is nothing unusual in overruling precedents
426. Fairman, supra note 409, at 87; cf Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman
(Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with Harvard Law School).
427. WILLIAM NELSON, TEr FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 6 (1988).
428. Fairman, supra note 409, at 87. In depreciating legislative history, Fairman was rejecting
Justice Black's argument that the term "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment did not include
corporations, Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (Black, J., dis-
senting), Black's incorporation argument in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting), and the then current political attack upon the Court's decision in Brown.
429. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
430. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
431. Fairman, supra note 409, at 91.
432. State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1949) (quoting Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commis-
sioners, 123 S.E. 636, 638 (1924)).
433. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). A portion of the Edwards opinion bears a
close relationship to that later used in Brown. In overruling an 1837 decision, Justice Brynes
dealt with the change in attitude. "Whatever may have been the notion then prevailing, we do
not think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is without employment
and without funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence."' Id. at 177. In Brown, the Court used
similar language in referring to the changes in sociology. Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954) ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson ....").
434. Fairman, supra note 409, at 92. This was part of Fairman's summary of Brynes's ap-
proach to the problem in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), but was undoubtedly in-
tended to apply to Brown as well.
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in light of further study, deeper reflection, or change in
circumstances." 435
Fairman ended with an account of those condemning segregation,
beginning with President Truman's 1948 executive order desegre-
gating the armed forces436 and progressing to more recent resolutions
and actions of various Christian churches.437 Recalling the language
of his earlier letter to Frankfurter, 438 Fairman concluded that "[i]n the
long perspective, the path is plain. '439 Appearing to quote the words
of Mississippi Senator Lamar in 1874, Fairman argued that this "great
principle... must sooner or later be enforced, though institutions and
constitutions should have to give way alike before it."440
In its February 1957 Symposium issue the Vanderbilt Law Review
published Charles Fairman's article, Samuel F. Miller, Justice of the
Supreme Court, 1862-1890.441
The incorporation debate came into public view again in 1959 af-
ter the reargument of Bartkus v. Illinois.44 2 The reason for this is not
apparent. The question before the Court was whether an acquittal of
the charge of bank robbery in the federal court would bar, under the
435. Fairman, supra note 409, at 91.
436. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,313 (1948).
437. Fairman, supra note 409, at 93.
438. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (June 15, 1956) (on file with Library
of Congress).
439. Fairman, supra note 409, at 93.
440. Id. at 94 (quoting 2 CONG. REc. 3411 (1874)). Fairman took great liberties in indicating
that "[t]hese are the words of Senator Lamar." Id. The occasion of Lamar's speech was the
death of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner. Fairman isolated the quotes from passages
suggesting, albeit in mild, polite language, Lamar's own disagreement with Sumner and then
edited the quoted sentences themselves to remove the references indicating that Lamar was
speaking of Sumner's beliefs ("Behind all that lay for him [Sumner] ...." and "his great princi-
ple, he held"). In this way Fairman made it appear that the ideas Lamar actually attributed to
Sumner were Lamar's own beliefs. See 2 CONG. REc. 3411 (1874).
441. Charles Falrman, Samuel F. Miller, Justice of the Supreme Court, 1862-1890, 10 VAND. L.
REV. 193 (1957). Fairman indicated that much of what was printed here had already been pub-
lished in his biography of Miller.
Other articles in that issue were: Alfred 0. Canon, Mr. Justice Rutledge and the Roosevelt
Court, 10 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1957); David G. Farrelly, A Sketch of John Marshall Harlan's Pre-
Court Career, 10 VAND. L. REV. 209 (1957); Robert J. Harris, Chief Justice Taney: Prophet of
Reform and Reaction, 10 VAND. L. REV. 227 (1957); Samuel Hendel, The 'Liberalism' of Chief
Justice Hughes, 10 VAND. L. REV. 259 (1957); Samuel J. Konefsky, Holmes and Brandeis: Com-
panions in Dissent, 10 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1957); Robert S. Lancaster, Judge Hand's Views on
the Free Speech Problem, 10 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1957); Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter-Law and Choice, 10 VAND. L REV. 333 (1957); F. William O'Brien, S.J., Justice William
Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power, 10 VAND. L. REV. 351 (1957); John P. Roche, The Uto-
pian Pilgrimage of Mr. Justice Murphy, 10 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1957); Howard J. Graham, The
Supreme Court of History, 10 VAND. L REV. 395 (1957); and Otis P. Dobie, Recent Judicial
Biographies: A Composite Review, 10 VAND. L. REV. 403 (1957).
442. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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double jeopardy doctrine, a new trial and conviction in the state court
on the same charge. 4 3
It was entirely possible for Justice Frankfurter to have resolved
the question in the government's favor without any reference to
whether the Due Process Clause "incorporated" double jeopardy
against the state. 4" But Frankfurter began with the incorporation
question."45 After invoking precedent," 6 Frankfurter turned to his-
tory, stating that "[t]he relevant historical materials have been can-
vassed by this Court and by legal scholars.""447 The only scholar
referred to was Charles Fairman and Frankfurter's footnote cited only
Fairman's 1949 Stanford article. 448 According to Frankfurter, Fair-
man's article demonstrated "conclusively" that neither the Congress
nor the ratifying state legislature contemplated that the Fourteenth
Amendment would apply the Bill of Rights to the states."49
Frankfurter then summarized Fairman's research indicating sup-
posed inconsistencies between state provisions and those in the Bill of
Rights,450 and reproduced Fairman's findings in chart form as an Ap-
pendix to his majority opinion.451 Later, in what was an obvious refer-
ence to Crosskey, but without citation, Frankfurter wrote that "[s]ome
recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft device for
establishing a centralized government are not only without factual jus-
tification but fly in the face of history.
452
In Poe v. Ullman,453 Harlan dissented from a Frankfurter opinion,
citing Fairman as authority454 and in School District of Abington
443. Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, stated
that the state was really a proxy and agent of the Federal government in what amounted to a
second federal prosecution. Id. at 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
444. Indeed, Black and Brennan's dissents each rested on alternative grounds. Id. at 150
(Black, J., dissenting), 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
445. Id. at 124.
446. Id. ("We have held from the beginning and uniformly" that there is no incorporation of
the Bill of Rights.).
447. Id. (footnote omitted). Only a definition of "relevance" excluding the Fourteenth
Amendment Congressional debates would suggest that the opponents of incorporation on the
Court had ever publicly "canvassed" the "relevant historical materials."
448. Id. at 124 n.3.
449. Id. at 124.
450. Id. at 124-26.
451. Id. at 140-49. Frankfurter did not acknowledge the existence of Crosskey's work or
indicate that he took Crosskey's criticism of the conflicts Frankfurter reproduced into account.
452. Id. at 137. I am grateful to Professor Akhil Amar for calling my attention to this
paragraph.
453. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
454. Id. at 540 (citing Fairman's Stanford article for the proposition that the legislative his-
tory shed "little light" on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, Justice Brennan cited Fairman's
Fourteenth Amendment study in his concurring opinion.455
By 1965, the Court had "incorporated" much of the Bill of Rights
through the Due Process Clause. On April 5, 1965, less than two
months after Frankfurter's death, Justice Black announced the unani-
mous decision in Pointer v. Texas456 in which the Court used the Due
Process Clause to enforce the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment against the states. Elizabeth Black wrote in her diary
that Pointer's effect was to give Justice Black's Adamson dissent "the
virtue of becoming the law."'457
Almost as if in response to the suggestions of Morrison's 1949
article, Justice Black indicated in his 1967 opinion in Duncan v. Loui-
siana458 that what he wrote in his 1947 Adamson dissent was "the
product of years of study and research. ' 459 In his own Frankfurtian
dissent in Duncan, Justice Harlan relied upon Fairman, finding that
the "overwhelming historical evidence" he marshalled demonstrated
"conclusively" that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.46 0 Black re-
jected Fairman's account because it was largely negative and because
it ignored the realities of the legislative process:
My appraisal of the legislative history followed 10 years of legisla-
tive experience as a Senator of the United States, not a bad way, I
suspect, to learn the value of what is said in legislative debates.... I
know from my years in the United States Senate that it is to men
like Congressman Bingham, who steered the Amendment through
the House, and Senator Howard, who introduced it in the Senate,
that members of Congress look when they seek the real meaning of
what is being offered .... 461
The conflict arose once more in 1970 in In re Winship where the
Court held that due process required proof of guilt beyond a reason-
455. 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) (citing Fairman for the contention that the Establishment
Clause did not apply to the states).
456. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
457. BLACK & BLACK, supra note 110, at 109. Fairman's Stanford article was also cited in a
list of other authorities setting forth the "arguments" on incorporation in Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 411 n.1.
458. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
459. Id. at 164 (Black, J., concurring).
460. Id. at 174-75. Harlan also cited Fairman's Fourteenth Amendment article in his dissent
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 602 n.30 (1963), his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Black and Stewart's dissent did "not rest on historical reasons, which
are of course wholly lacking"), and his dissenting opinion in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 285
n.44 (1967) (on Fourteenth Amendment debates on citizenship).
461. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 164-65 (Black, J., concurring).
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able doubt to support a criminal conviction.462 In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Harlan expressed "continued bafflement" at Black's
approach to due process.46 3 According to Harlan, Black's "thesis flies
in the face of the course of judicial history... as well as the uncontro-
verted scholarship." 4 Discounting Horace Flack's 1908 study and ig-
noring Crosskey's work, Harlan relied solely on Fairman's 1949
Stanford article to support his historical claims.46 5
Black defended Flack's work as being "equally scholarly" in com-
parison to Fairman's work, noted that "almost all the provisions of the
Bill of Rights" had been held applicable to the states and, in what was
undoubtedly the use of Fairman as a surrogate for Harlan, concluded,
"to me this history indicates that in the end Mr. Flack's thesis has
fared much better than Mr. Fairman's 'uncontroverted' scholar-
ship.' 46 6 Within the context of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Black's observation is as valid today as it was
in 1970.
XV. LAST YEARS
The existing collection of Fairman/Frankfurter correspondence
ends on November 4, 1957, 467 though Fairman and Frankfurter saw
each other on at least two subsequent occasions. 46 8 After suffering a
stroke, Justice Frankfurter resigned from the Court in 1962, the same
year Fairman retired from the Harvard Law faculty. Fairman "retired"
to work on his volume of the'Holmes Devise.46 9
462. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
463. Id. at 373.
464. Id. It is unfortunate that neither Black nor Harlan were apparently aware of Alfred
Avins's 1968 article on incorporation, Avins, supra note 361, which was an even-handed effort to
assess the contributions of both Fairman and Crosskey to our understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
465. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 373; HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPrn N OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1908), was cited by Black in Adamson.
Nine months later, Harlan relied on Fairman's admonition that contemporaries "know so
much more about the constitutional law of the Fourteenth Amendment than the men who
adopted it .... " in his opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 162-63 n.14 (1970).
466. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 382-83 n.11. In that same note Black made it clear that he was
not relying solely upon the Due Process Clause, but on "the entire first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment...." Id.
467. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1957) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
468. Frankfurter's calendar shows appointments with Fairman on March 30, 1959 and Sep-
tember 23, 1964 (on file with Library of Congress).
469. When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes died, he left most of his estate to the United
States government. Eventually the Holmes Devise fund was created with the primary purpose of
creating a Supreme Court history. E.g., David Margolick, Justice Holmes's 1935 Bequest Remains
Unfulfilled, N.Y. TImEs, May 3, 1983, at 26; Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75 VA. L. REV.
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Felix Frankfurter had been instrumental in the first proposals
concerning the use of the Holmes Devise470 and may have been influ-
ential in the 1956 selection of Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund as
the project's editor-in-chief.47
1
Fairman and Freund were two of the five people initially asked to
submit an "Advisory Memorandum" to the Committee for the
Holmes Devise. 472 The Librarian of Congress, L. Quincy Mumford,
Paul Freund, and Fairman agreed that Fairman's memorandum would
give "special attention" to the eras in which Taney, Chase, and Waite
had been Chief Justices. 473 In a separate "Supplementary Memoran-
dum" concerning procedures and personnel, Fairman suggested that
the "director" of the entire "enterprise" be "a man of intellectual and
professional distinction, well qualified to lead a group of scholars. '474
Fairman recommended his colleague on the Harvard Law Faculty as
"incomparable. '475 Indeed, Fairman indicated he could "think of no
other appointment that would give such universal satisfaction or in-
spire such confidence. '476
Within a month after Fairman submitted his memorandum, the
committee decided to extend an offer to Paul Freund to serve as the
project's editor-in-chief. 477 But if Freund was not available, then
Charles Fairman was the Committee's second choice for editor-in-
chief.478 In the midst of a disagreement with Frankfurter in 1957,
1429, 1429-30 n.2 (1989) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DE-
VISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35 (1988)).
470. Margolick, supra note 469.
471. Professor to Edit History of Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1956, at 15.
Frankfurter encouraged Freund to accept "the call" to direct the Holmes Devise history
some three months before Freund's appointment was announced to the public. Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund (May 31, 1956) (on file with Library of Congress). When
Freund did accept, Frankfurter referred to him as "the Historian-in-Chief" of the Court's history
and later as "The historian of the Supreme Court." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund
(Sept. 11, 1956) (on file with Library of Congress); see also Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Paul
Freund (July 16, 1958) (on file with Library of Congress).
472. Letter from Charles Fairman to L. Quincy Mumford (Apr. 24, 1956) (on file with Li-
brary of Congress); SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF TIE PERMANENT COMMITTEE
FOR THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE 3, 11 (1956). Julius Goebel, Robert E. Cushman,
and Carl Swisher were also asked to help. Id. at 11.
473. SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE 11 (1956).
474. SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM FOR THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE SUGGESTIONS ON PROCEDURE AND PERSONNEL (1956).
475. Id
476. Id
477. SUMMARY REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE (1956).
478. Id.
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Fairman wrote that, "[f]or the first time in a long while, I see a clear
road ahead for working on Bradley."479
Just six months later, on June 16, 1957, Fairman was named to
write a volume of the history.480 Freund was on the Harvard Law
School faculty all the years in which Fairman taught there.481 Given
the consideration to Fairman as editor-in-chief of the project if Freund
declined and his extensive work on Justices Bradley" 2 and Miller, 483
Fairman was a natural choice.
By August, Fairman decided to concurrently bring out his book
on Bradley and his volume of the Holmes Devise.484 Frankfurter
passed away in 1965 and did not live to see the fruition of Fairman's
work.
479. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 18, 1957) (on file with Library of
Congress). At times Frankfurter seemed to take advantage of Fairman's friendship. He dis-
played insensitivity by refusing to allow Fairman to fully enjoy the publication of his 1948 Consti-
tutional Law casebook by balancing his praise of Fairman with ever greater praise of James
Bradley Thayer. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Dec. 8, 1948) (on file with
Library of Congress). Knowing that Fairman was having difficulty with an article on which he
was working, Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 16, 1956) (on file with
Library of Congress), Frankfurter nevertheless complained about Fairman's use of an orchestra
director as an analogy to the Chief Justice, id. (a "dangerous figure of speech"), even though he
had used that analogy himself in Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 900 (1953).
See also Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman (Sept. 11, 1956) (on file with Harvard
Law School).
In 1957 Frankfurter wrote to "My dear Harvard Legal Historians", Charles Fairman, Sa-
muel Thorne and Mark DeWolfe Howe, about a project involving Judge Learned Hand's trial
notes from his service as U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York. Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman, Mark DeWolfe Howe, & Samuel Thorne (Jan. 2, 1957) (on
file with Library of Congress). Fairman wrote a response which recognized the importance of
the papers and indicated that they needed to find someone like "Alex Bickel" to undertake the
project. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 18, 1957) (on file with Library of
Congress). Frankfurter, apparently finding his project more important than others Harvard was
encouraging, found the response upsetting. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman
(Jan. 22, 1957) (on file with Library of Congress) ("[S]eldom have I received a more unsatisfac-
tory reply to a letter of mine.").
480. 5 Named to Write History of Court, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1956, at 50. Fairman was
formally invited to write this volume on December 13, 1956. Letter from L. Quincy Mumford to
Charles Fairman (Dec. 13, 1956) (on file with Library of Congress). Fairman accepted the offer
by a letter dated January 4, 1957. Letter from Charles Fairman to L. Quincy Mumford (Jan. 4,
1957) (on file with Library of Congress).
481. Freund taught at Harvard from 1940-1976. AALS DIRECrORY OF LAW TEACHERS,
1980-81, at 382.
482. See supra note 34.
483. See supra note 34.
484. Letter from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 20, 1957) (on file with Harvard
Law School). Fairman added that Bradley certainly got himself into some situations that have to
be explained with infinite care, and he did virtually nothing to make plain the path of one who
might seek to follow." He told Frankfurter that he counted on "longevity" to be able to finish
Bradley.
Fairman's FIvE JusncEs, supra note 34, at 176-96, contained a sketch of Bradley's life. But
this was not the type of biography which Fairman contemplated.
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Crosskey continued on the faculty of the University of Chicago.
His 1954 law review article critiquing Fairman was his last significant
publication. 48 5 He retired from Chicago in 1963 and spent the last
years of his life suffering from crippling arthritis.486 He died in
1968.487
Death claimed Justice Black on September 25, 1971, the same
year Charles Fairman published Part I, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-1888. It turned out to be a 1981-page volume with more than one
thousand cases cited in its table of cases. Though criticized in later
years488 the initial reviews of the book provided the type of accolades
which one would expect for a prominent scholar completing the "cap-
stone" of his academic efforts.489 Part II was published in 1987.
Finally, in 1988, Fairman published his Supplement to his volumes
of the Devise, an account of the Election of 1876 and the Electoral
Commission of 1877. 490 There were no reviews of Part II and Five
Justices and the Electoral Commission, but they were almost immedi-
ately criticized.4
91
485. The Legacy of William Crosskey, supra note 301, at 960.
486. Gregory, supra note 9, at 246. He did teach one year at Howard Law School.
487. Krash, supra note 301, at 960; WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, supra note 9.
488. ERic FoNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
257 n.53 (1988) (criticizing RECONSTRUCTION I for resting on an "outdated interpretation of
Reconstruction").
489. See e.g., Willard Hurst, Book Review, 58 A.B.A. J. 955 (1972) ("The volume sets a new
model and standard in telling the Court's story."); William Gangi, Book Review, 8 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 123, 127 (1972) ("Fairman unfolds the dramatic story with the rare ability to integrate the
various political cross currents and personalities while at the same time isolating the legal is-
sues."); Morton Keller, Book Review, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1082, 1082-83 (1972) (Fairman's re-
search is "unparalleled in the literature" of the Court. He tells the story of the Court with
"breathtaking skill", and he has set "an Olympian standard" with his volume.)
At the same time there were those who, while praising the volume, still made substantial
criticisms. Gerhard Casper, Book Review, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 913, 915 (1973) ("all too often
[Fairman] leaves [the] chronology involved, interspersing it with short evaluative comments but
rarely offering the reader the sum of his own evaluation."); John Semonche, Book Review, 51
N.C. L. REV. 375, 382-83 (1972) (ignoring "the body of literature" on reconstruction and, finding
the volume "too long, too disjointed, and too casually organized," thinking it cried out for a
"ruthless" editor); Harry N. Scheiber & Michael E. Parrish, Book Review, 17 AM. J. OF LEGAL
HIST. 303, 307-08 (1973) (Fairman "disdains direct confrontations with the historiography of his
subject" and his "presentism" is a "leading characteristic" of his approach, which "reaches an
extreme in his analysis of Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases.")
(footnote omitted).
One of the most thoughtful critiques of Fairman's work was Michael L. Benedict, Book
Review, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 862 (1972) (criticizing the failure to state and support conclusions
and expressing a "feeling of disappointment, an oppressive sense of opportunity lost.").
490. This work was initially 400 pages. See Margolick, supra note 469.
491. Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 522
n.8 (1989) (criticizing RECONSTRUCTION II and FIVE JUsTICEs AND TiE ELECTORAL COMMIS-
SION for "ignor[ing] much of the best work done in Reconstruction studies over the past twenty
years.")
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In 1988, the same year as the publication of Five Justices and the
Electoral Commission, death claimed Charles Fairman, bringing to a
close the last life of these four remarkable men. Of course, their pro-
fessional work lives on.
Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter loom large in the history of
the Supreme Court. Their opinions continue to be cited and bio-
graphical work on both men is ongoing. Though Crosskey's book was
apparently too controversial to be cited by his contemporaries,4 92 the
passage of time has seen the citation of his work in both dissenting
and majority opinions of the Supreme Court.493
Crosskey's former colleagues and students continue to uphold his
accomplishments in the written records of their school.494 William Jef-
frey, Jr., one of Crosskey's students, published a third volume of
Crosskey's research in 1980,4 95 and the University of Chicago Law
School has preserved his memory with the William Crosskey Lecture
in Legal History.
496
As Paul Freund wrote in his Editor's Foreword, Fairman's work was thought to "vindicate"
Justice Bradley. FIVE JusricEs, supra note 34, at iv. Yet while bringing new information to bear
and subjecting the work of others to critical examination, Fairman appears to have been unable
to subject any matter which might touch Justice Bradley to even sympathetic skepticism. A
striking example is his account of the private one-hour meeting between Bradley and two Demo-
cratic lawyers supporting Tilden during the proceeding of the Electoral Commission. Fairman
concluded that the two lawyers "were counsel of standing and understanding: it is not to be
supposed that they called upon the Justice with any thought of applying pressure but only to
inquire whether a line of argument might be useful." Id. at 112.
492. One may surmise this from the fact that, with the exception of Justice Douglas's dissent
in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting), his work was not relied
upon by any Supreme Court Justice's during the contemporary debate over Crosskey's work.
493. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 n.12 (1987) (majority opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist); Department of Revenue of the State of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Steve-
doring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 760 n.26 (1978) (majority opinion by Justice Powell rejecting Cross-
key's interpretation that the word "duties" encompasses excises); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 290-91 (1976) (majority opinion by Justice Brennan indicating, in the text, that
Crosskey's interpretation of the words in the Import-Export Clause was "persuasive"); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 476 n.6 (1967) (majority opinion by Justice Clark).
494. See e.g., Gregory, supra note 334; Harry Kalven, Jr., Our Man from Wall Street, 35 U.
Cm. L. REV. 229 (1968); Stanley N. Katz, William Crosskey's Politics and the Constitution, Vol-
ume 3, 28 THE LAW SCH. REC. 9 (1982); Katz, supra note 331; Abe Krash, William Winslow
Crosskey, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 232 (1968); Abe Krash, William Winslow Crosskey and the Consti-
tution, 33 THE LAW ScI. REC. 12 (1987); Sharp, supra note 334.
495. WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., PoLrTCS AND THE CONSTITrION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME III: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION (1980). This book was reviewed by, among others, one of Crosskey's former
students, Abe Krash. See The Legacy of William Crosskey, supra note 301.
496. Katz, supra note 331.
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Fairman's work on Miller and Bradley continues to dominate the
field, his 1949 Stanford article is considered a "classic," 497 and he con-
tinues to be cited by Justices of the Supreme Court.498 His first vol-
ume of Reconstruction and Reunion is also still cited by the Justices.499
XVI. CONCLUSION
This narrative takes one on a roller coaster ride in intellectual
history. Fairman's pioneering efforts at examining and perhaps help-
ing to preserve the private papers of Justice Bradley and Justice Miller
are invaluable. His biography of Justice Miller remains the only full-
length biography in the field.50°
His articles on Justice Bradley remain our primary source of in-
formation on the Justice. One can only regret that Fairman did not
complete his plan to publish a biography of Bradley.
501
One also has a sense of intellectual curiosity and exhilaration in
Fairman's discovery of the role Bradley played in Waite's Munn deci-
sion 502 and intellectual excitement in Fairman's ability to privately
share these matters with Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice
Hughes.503 One can smile at Hughes and Frankfurter sharing Fair-
man's discovery of what Hughes termed "that delicious remark" of
Justice Miller about Justice Bradley: "[t]he trouble with Bradley is
that he does not recognize my intellectual preeminence." 504
One may even turn a blind eye to the preoccupation of Fairman
and Frankfurter with economic regulation and the danger of Lochner
497. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1237, 1253 (1986).
498. See e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 535 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
499. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 193 (1989) (majority opinion by Jus-
tice Brennan); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 672 n.2 (1987) (majority opinion by
Justice Brennan); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 509 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Monell
v. Department of Social Serv. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,673 n.28 (1978) (majority opinion
by Justice Brennan).
500. The fact that it is the most recent biography may reflect that the quality of his work,
rather than a lack of interest, has discouraged other scholars from trying to improve upon it.
501. CONTEMPORARY AurTsoRs 45-48 (Clare D. Kinsman) lists, with Fairman's books, an
entry entitled "Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court 1870-1892, Boston University Press
1953." This is simply Fairman's 1949 lecture "What Makes A Great Justice?," supra note 36, with
a hard cover.
Besides beginning anew and writing a biography of Bradley, one of the services which some
scholar could perform for legal historians is to gather Fairman's writings together in one edited
volume.
502. Granger Cases, supra note 34.
503. See Diary of Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 25, 1947) (on file with Library of Congress); Letter
from Charles Fairman to Felix Frankfurter (June 8, 1950) (on file with Harvard Law School).
504. Diary of Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 25, 1947) (on file with Library of Congress); see also
DIAims, supra note 36, at 312.
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even after the triumph of the New Deal5°5 and overlook the lack of
critical analysis of both Bradley and Miller as part of the genre of a
less exacting period of scholarship or as a natural result of people ab-
sorbed with the subject of their writing.
But there is a less palatable side of this story as well. Fairman's
entry into the adversary process with his 1949 Stanford article causes
considerable pause as to whether he was then the disinterested scholar
or the self-appointed surrogate of Justice Frankfurter in combatting
the views of Justice Black. However one may resolve that question,
the evolution of Fairman's position by 1954 of treating the question of
the intent of the framer's of the Fourteenth Amendment not as a mat-
ter of history or of law, but a "public relations" effort to ensure that
the view he wanted to prevail would prevail, is a sad chapter in the
history of academia. Further, given their close relationship, one won-
ders about the appropriateness of Frankfurter's reliance upon Fair-
man without public acknowledgment of that relationship.
5°6
In his 1956 essay on Justice Bradley,50 7 Fairman spoke of Willard
Hurst's complaint that lawyers talking about "great" judges always
came up with one of the ten names on Dean Pound's list. Hurst had
expressed a suspicion that this was because they relied upon Pound
rather than upon their own reading and judgment.508 In Fairman's
view Willard Hurst was "chiding... lawyers for not interpreting such
history and biography anew." 50 9 Fairman himself indicated that it was
"important to reinterpret [the] history [of influential jurists] in a con-
temporary context. '510
505. Thomas C. Grey has referred to "the obsession of the later Progressives and New Deal-
ers with the Lochner line of cases." Thomas C. Grey, Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on Its Origin,
Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 28, 29 (1993).
Crosskey too, was mired in the problems of the 1930s. While a series of critical reviews by
scholars like Julius Goebel and Henry Hart discredited much of Crosskey's work, it has been
suggested that lack of continuing interest in the problems which Crosskey discussed was because
they had been solved and new problems, like Brown v. Board of Education, had emerged. BOB-
Brrr, supra note 299, at 21.
Indeed, as noted by Philip Bobbitt "the frustration of the New Deal Congress by the Court
was largely solved by the very methods which Crosskey despised and by the institution whose
role he wished to limit." Id.
506. I realize our traditions are to the contrary. But what would have been wrong if Frank-
furter had written, in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.): "The work of
my former student and friend Charles Fairman has demonstrated conclusively that ..
507. Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 34, at 65.
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As important as Fairman's work was for his own generation, our
task is to follow Fairman's admonition and interpret the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Court "anew."

